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ABSTRACT 
 
The contractual and criminal bases for duress in Canada, the United 
States, and the Commonwealth are currently in disrepair. Contract law 
serves to enforce binding agreements that are reflective of our choices, but 
duress threatens to nullify that very purpose. In addition to the contractual 
basis of duress, the law of duress has developed from a criminal defense 
perspective, but it has been difficult to apply. Controversy surrounds the 
defense particularly where the threats involve the sacrifice of an innocent 
person. Only by examining the philosophical, historical, and current state 
of this defense in the civil and criminal context can one begin to repair 
and reformulate the defense of duress for future application. 
 
 
 † R. v. Ruzic (1998), 41 O.R. 3d 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.), supp. reasons 165 D.L.R. (4th) 574 
(Can.), (per Laskin J.A., referring to criticisms of Fish J.A. in R. v. Langlois (1993), 54 Q.A.C. 87 
(Can. Que. C.A.)).  
  Frances E. Chapman, Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, St. Jerome‘s University, 
University of Waterloo, Waterloo Ontario Canada. I thank St. Jerome‘s University for its generous 
research support. I am much indebted to my research assistant, and former student, Melody 
Jahanzadeh for her unending assistance with this Article. Thank you for your expert assistance with 
research and editing. I would also like to thank Professor Winifred Holland for her unfaltering 
assistance and mentorship during my LL.M. degree, and for continuing to challenge me on all aspects 
of the criminal law. This Article would not have been possible without her encyclopeadic knowledge 
of criminal law defenses. Thank you also to Professor Sally Gunz for her support in expanding my 
research in this area and for her suggestion that I present this research at the Academy of Legal Studies 
in Business Conference in Richmond, Virginia in August 2010.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
216 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:215 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 216 
I. THE HISTORY OF DURESS .................................................................... 220 
A. Historical Underpinnings of Contractual Duress ........................ 220 
B. The History of the Criminal Defense of Duress ........................... 224 
C. The Codification of the Canadian Criminal Defense of Duress ... 228 
II. THE DEFINITIONS AND MODERN FORMS OF DURESS ......................... 233 
A. The Definition of Contractual Duress .......................................... 233 
B. Modern Contractual Duress ......................................................... 238 
C. Definition of Criminal Duress ...................................................... 239 
D. Modern Criminal Duress .............................................................. 241 
III. THE ESSENTIAL ISSUES: WILL, EXCLUDED OFFENSES, THREATS 
TO THIRD PARTIES, THE CANADIAN ―OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE 
STANDARD,‖ AND BURDEN OF PROOF .............................................. 249 
A. The ―Will‖ of the Individual ......................................................... 249 
1. Overborne Will and Contractual Duress ................................ 250 
2. Overborne Will and Criminal Law .......................................... 251 
B. Excluded Offenses—Criminal and Contractual ........................... 254 
C. Threat ........................................................................................... 259 
1. Threats to Third Parties in Contract Law ............................... 260 
2. Threats to Third Parties in Criminal Law ............................... 263 
D. Canada‘s ―Objective-Subjective‖ Standard ................................ 264 
1. Canada‘s ―Objective-Subjective‖ Standard in Contractual 
Duress ..................................................................................... 264 
2. Canada‘s ―Objective-Subjective‖ Standard in Criminal 
Duress ..................................................................................... 268 
E. Burden of Proof ............................................................................ 271 
1. Contractual Duress ................................................................. 271 
2. Criminal Duress ...................................................................... 273 
IV. COMPARISON OF CONTRACTUAL AND CRIMINAL DURESS ............... 277 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 281 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The contractual and criminal bases for duress in Canada, the United 
States, and the Commonwealth
1
 are currently in disrepair on certain issues 
 
 
 1. For the purposes of this Article, the Commonwealth includes the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia, England, and a brief reference to India. 
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after a long and sordid history. For that reason, there is a real need to 
examine the state of the duress defense in both realms. Contract law is 
more than an allowance to make binding agreements reflecting our 
choices; contract law also protects those who do not make agreements of 
their own free will. Contract law responds to duress because to ―enforce 
agreements made by fraud or coercion would nullify the point of allowing 
binding agreements in the first place.‖2  
Historically, contractual duress was applied in narrowly circumscribed 
situations.
3
 A contract could only be vitiated if it had been ―procured as a 
result of actual or threatened physical violence (‗duress of the person‘)‖ 
obtained through aggression or threat of crime or tort.
4
 For example, 
individuals could avoid a contract in 1642, according to Lord Coke, if 
there was a ―fear of losse of life, 2. of losse of member, 3. of mayhem, and 
4. of imprisonment; otherwise it is for fear of battery, which might be very 
light, or for burning of his houses, or taking away, or destroying of his 
goods or the life, for there he may have satisfaction in damages.‖5 Yet, 
even in these cases, recovery occurred for ―duress of goods‖ only on a 
restrictive basis.
6
 Duress of goods was increasingly recognized by the 
Commonwealth as well as U.S. courts, and the duress defense began to 
develop more fully.
7
 This recognition also extended to the more inclusive 
concept of ―economic duress‖ as well as ―business compulsion.‖8 Yet, 
defining the test for contractual duress has encountered difficulties. 
In addition to the evolution of duress from a contract law standpoint, 
the law of duress has also developed from a criminal law basis. The goal 
of criminal law is to ―create a set of rules that best implements our 
collective sense of justice.‖9 But, when it comes to the criminal defense of 
duress, centuries of development have failed to produce a workable basis 
 
 
 2. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 20–21 (1987).  
 3. CHRISTINE BOYLE & DAVID PERCY, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 710 (6th ed. 
1999). 
 4. Id. at 710. 
 5. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 432 (1990) (citing Lord Coke, 
E. Coke, Second Institute 482–83 (1642)). This list was interpreted by courts many years later, see 
Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 14 (NJ) as ―(1) For fear of loss of life; (2) For fear of loss of 
limb; (3) For fear of mayhem; (4) For fear of imprisonment.‖  
 6. BOYLE & PERCY, supra note 3, at 710.  
 7. Herbert Fingarette, Victimization: A Legalist Analysis of Coercion, Deception, Undue 
Influence, and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 65, 86 n.55 (1985).  
 8. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 433. For the purposes of this paper, duress in its more 
physical and overt form will be discussed. For a discussion of business compulsion see Pharmacy 
Care Systems Ltd. v Attorney General [2004] CA 198/03 16 Aug. 2004, para. 92 (N.Z.). 
 9. Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One‘s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of 
Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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capable of supporting a common law or codified version of the defense.
10
 
Over time, the defense of duress (also called compulsion, compulsion by 
threats, or coercion)
11
 was conceptualized as a full defense in criminal law, 
as a ―concession to human infirmity in the face of an overwhelming evil 
threatened by another.‖12 Controversy, however, surrounds the defense 
where the threats involve the sacrifice of one innocent life to save another 
innocent life creating a ―love-hate relationship‖ with the defense in the 
criminal law context.
13
 In other words, our emotional reaction to duress is 
linked to our feelings about those who ―allow‖ themselves to be coerced.14 
Joshua Dressler notes that when we are concerned about locating ―victims 
and villains,‖ it is hard to classify someone who has succumbed to a 
threat.
15
 He offers the classic example of an individual with a gun to his 
head who agrees to kill a child to escape death, and Dressler questions 
whether this person is a victim or a villain whose ―aversion to dying was 
greater than his aversion to killing?‖16 These are difficult questions with 
no simple answers. 
The law of criminal duress has become even more complicated in 
Canada with the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
in 1982 (Charter).
17
 Generally, if a Canadian court decides that a case 
deals with an issue under the Canadian Constitution, it must then 
determine if a guaranteed right of all citizens has been infringed upon. The 
Charter sets out the ―fundamental freedoms‖ of all Canadians.18 In 
criminal law, the courts routinely review the definition of criminal offenses 
to ensure conformity with the Charter; however, when examining Charter 
challenges to defenses, the cases are rare and often unsuccessful.
19
  
 
 
 10. Id. at 1 n.2. 
 11. See J. LI. J. Edwards, Compulsion, Coercion and Criminal Responsibility 14 MOD. L. REV. 
297, 297 (1951). The terms coercion and duress will refer to the same legal principle. For a further 
discussion, see Fingarette, Victimization, supra note 7.  
 12. DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW: A TREATISE 462 (4th ed. 2001). A ―full defense‖ 
in Canadian criminal law may result in a complete acquittal in contrast to a ―partial defence‖ which 
goes either to part of the action or to mitigation rather than resulting in a full acquittal. 
 13. Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its 
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1331 (1989).  
 14. Id. at 1332. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1332 (citing Alan Brudner, A Theory of Necessity, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 353 
(1987)).  
 17.  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11; 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).  
 18. This includes freedoms of association, speech, expression, and religion. 
 21. Stanley Yeo, Challenging Moral Involuntariness as a Principle of Fundamental Justice, 28 
QUEEN‘S L.J. 335, 339 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/1
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Despite these developments of duress in both civil and criminal law, 
the defense of duress requires more analysis to best protect unwitting 
victims. By examining the philosophical, historical, and current state of 
the defense in both civil and criminal law, there is a chance for a clearer 
formulation for duress.
20
 Through this analysis, it seems the intent of the 
earliest framers of the law was that the defense of duress would not be 
fully codified but rather it would remain flexible through the use of the 
common law. This Article contends that a new, more flexible standard 
should replace the current, more stringent version of the defense.
21
 
Undeniably, there has been an ―extraordinary expansion of the scope of 
duress‖ in the contractual realm, while there has been an absolute 
narrowing of the criminal defense so that it is hardly used successfully in 
any modern case.
22
 The following analysis shows that the current state of 
the duress defense is ―irrational, anomalous, perverse, illogical and 
fundamentally wrong,‖23 and it is deeply misunderstood. This Article 
examines the law in Canada as well as a few U.S. and Commonwealth 
cases.
24
 Part I examines the historical development of the defense and the 
writings of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, one of the first major modern 
theorists on duress, as well as the development of the civil law formulation 
of duress. Part II examines the definition of contractual and criminal 
duress including the state of those concepts today in their respective 
disciplines, and the modern state of duress. Part III addresses the 
problematic issues in both civil and criminal contexts including the 
―overborne will‖ theory, excluded offenses, threats to third parties, the 
Canadian ―objective-subjective standard,‖ and the burden of proof. 
 
 
 20. For the purposes of this Article, only duress that is overtly physical or overtly illegitimate is 
examined. There is a great amount of debate about what constitutes duress that falls on the divide 
between legitimate and illegitimate pressure. NELSON ENONCHONG, DURESS, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND 
UNCONSCIONABLE DEALING 8 (2006). Additionally, this Article focuses only on duress of the person, 
both in the mental and physical forms of duress. This Article does not discuss other forms of duress 
that Enonchong aptly identifies: the duress of goods; economic duress; illegitimate threat of legal 
action (including illegitimate threat of criminal proceedings and illegitimate threat to institute civil 
proceedings); duress colore officii (where an individual gives money because of an unlawful demand 
by a public official, including implied threats or a threat to sue); the ―Woolwich‖ principle (where 
there is an ultra vires demand for tax based on invalid legislation); and payments made pursuant to an 
unlawful demand by a person other than a public official. See  id. at 7. 
 21. This flexible approach to the codified defense was used in the recent case of R. v. Ryan 
(2011), 301 NSR (2d) 255 (Nova Scotia Court of Appeal), discussed later in this Article. 
 22. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 448. 
 23. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (Can.).  
 24. A full discussion of the state of contractual duress in the United States is beyond the scope of 
this Article, rather the limited discussion is used to contrast the position of the law in other 
Commonwealth countries. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Finally, Part IV compares and contrasts the problems with duress in both 
contexts, and concludes with a look at the future for these concepts.  
I. THE HISTORY OF DURESS 
This Part discusses the history of the defense of duress in both contract 
law and in criminal law. 
A. Historical Underpinnings of Contractual Duress 
Contractual duress has a long history starting with the Romans. 
However, it has been said that the ―law in relation to [contractual] duress 
is not as clear as one might wish.‖25 Included in the edictum perpetuum of 
the Roman Emperor Hadrian was the phrase ―Quod metus causa gestum 
erit, ratum non habebo‖ which translates to ―[w]hat is done through fear I 
will not uphold.‖26 In this earliest of forms, this fear had to be felt by a 
―man of the most resolute character‖ and not a ―weak-minded man.‖27 
Many forms of this edict exist in relation to ―fear of personal harm, such 
as death, harm to physical integrity and loss of freedom, and possibility 
also fear of harm of an economic nature. Threats of harm to family are 
also covered.‖28 The form of duress envisioned by the Romans was to 
address ―compulsion through ‗bending‘ the will of the victim (‗mental‘ 
fear or vis compulsive).‖29 These complex theories about the nature of free 
will has ancient origins. 
 The earliest types of duress in civil law were those which had an overt 
physical element.
30
 These cases involved general contracts where the 
pressured parties were forced to sign an agreement and were little more 
than a ―mere mechanical instrument‖ and their actions were not considered 
to ―manifest assent.‖31 Lord Scarman summarized the history of 
contractual duress in Barton v. Armstrong saying that duress of this kind 
was limited:  
[A]t a comparatively early date equity began to grant relief in cases 
where the disposition in question had been procured by the exercise 
of pressure . . . considered to be illegitimate—although it did not 
 
 
 25. Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V. v. Mountain, [1999] Q.B. 674,726 (Can. C.A.). 
 26. JACQUES E. DU PLESSIS, COMPULSION IN ROMAN LAW 9 (1997). 
 27. Id. at 8. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 30. 
 30. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 430. 
 31. Id. at 430–31. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/1
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amount to common law duress . . . [t]here is an obvious analogy 
between setting aside a disposition for duress or undue influence 
and setting it aside for fraud.
32
  
Lord Scarman cited Justice Holmes in Fairbanks v. Snow stating that relief 
can be provided where the ―party has been subjected to an improper 
motive for action.‖33  
Duress in the civil law has been among the ―vitiating factors long 
recognized by the common law,‖34 however, the scope of the vitiation has 
been changing for centuries. The need to draw the line between 
permissible pressure in all contractual negotiations and pressure that is 
illegitimate has been the overwhelming consideration.
35
 The modern 
conception of contractual duress includes not only those physical threats to 
the person but also to one‘s ―personal liberty.‖36 
Similarly, the 1847 English case of Cumming v. Ince dealt with the 
forcible confinement in a ―private lunatic asylum‖ of a mother by her two 
married daughters and their husbands.
37
 After the daughters had forcibly 
committed their mother to the institution, they said that they would not 
pursue the finding of lunacy against her if she would sign over certain title 
deeds.
38
 Cumming alleged that the contract that was not binding because it 
was obtained by duress. Her lawyer‘s clerk testified that he believed that 
she ―acceded to the arrangement only from fear of these consequences.‖39 
The court held that even if her confinement was legitimate it was a 
―restraint on her will, which prevented any contract made under that 
duress from binding her.‖40 Justice Denman noted that ―she was induced to 
resign them by fear of personal suffering brought upon her by confinement 
in a lunatic asylum by the act of the defendants‖ and that the contract 
which resulted was not of her own free will.
41
 The court determined that 
Cumming was induced to sign the documents so she would be released 
from the asylum and the judge asked: ―[i]s not this truly described as 
 
 
 32. Barton v Armstrong, (1975) 2 W.L.R. 1050 ¶ 14 (Austl.). 
 33. See id. (citing Fairbanks v. Snow, 13 N.E. 596, 598 (Mass. 1887)).  
 34. ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 7. 
 35. Id. at 8. 
 36. Id. at 57. 
 37. Cumming v. Ince, (1847) 116 Eng. Rep. 418 (Q.B.) (Eng.).  
 38. Id. at 420. 
 39. Id. at 421.  
 40. Id. Interestingly, the court also questions, how ―those who apply for the commission affirm 
that the lunatic is able to negotiate an agreement of which his pecuniary interest and the proper care of 
his person are the only subjects?‖ Id.  
 41. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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duress?‖42 This rhetorical question led the court to confirm the verdict of 
the lower court: the contract was void for duress.  
There are a few important Canadian examples of contractual duress. 
One of the clearest examples is the 1877 case of Armstrong v. Gage.
43
 In 
Armstrong, the court was faced with a plaintiff of ―advanced years‖ who 
was ―wholly unacquainted with legal matters‖ and who was accused of 
defrauding the defendants by changing tickets of weight measurements for 
grain.
44
 The defendants were described as ―men of great shrewdness‖ who 
convinced the plaintiff that he was guilty of forgery, and if he could not 
prove otherwise, he would be convicted of a crime and sent to jail.
45
 The 
plaintiff was not allowed to consult with anyone, and was told that if he 
left the defendant‘s office he would be immediately arrested. The plaintiff 
was kept confined for at least four hours and told that the only resolution 
would be for him to immediately execute a mortgage for $600 on his 
property.
46
 The defendants claimed that the plaintiff was ―cool, clear, and 
collected‖ when he mortgaged the property.  
As a threshold matter, the court in Armstrong had to address the critical 
issue of who had the burden of proof. The court ruled that it is the 
plaintiff‘s burden to show that the mortgage was secured through duress, 
but ―no presumption is to be made against the plaintiff of being indebted 
to any amount; and the burden is thrown upon the defendant.‖47 The court 
found that the plaintiff was under duress as the defendants were ―violent 
and threatening‖ and that the plaintiff was afraid of arrest if he attempted 
to leave to obtain legal advice.
48
 Finding for the plaintiff, the court set 
aside the mortgage, made no presumptions against the plaintiff, and placed 
the burden on the defendants to prove that the grain transactions were 
inaccurate.
49
  
Later, Piper v. Harris Manufacturing Co.,
50
 concerned the sale of a 
mowing machine in return for a chattel mortgage on a horse for the price 
of the mower.
51
 In the course of this deal, the company became dissatisfied 
with their security and sought to give back the horse for a mower. The 
plaintiff, who was already subject to one criminal proceeding, claimed the 
 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Armstrong v. Gage, [1877] O.J.No. 199, 25 Gr. 1 602. (Can.). 
 44. Id. at 2. 
 45. Id. at 2–3. 
 46. Id. at 3. 
 47. Id. at 21. 
 48. Id. at 23. 
 49. Id. at 30. 
 50. Piper v. Harris Manufacturing Co., [1888] O.J. NO 46 (Ont. C.A.).  
 51. Id. para. 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/1
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defendants threatened him with another criminal action.
52
 Although he was 
not ―afraid of personal violence, or of the horse being taken by force,‖ the 
plaintiff said that he believed the criminal case threatened by the 
defendants would injure his prior criminal case if the threat did indeed 
manifest into another criminal charge.
53
 Justice Osler clarified that duress 
must involve a fear for loss of life, bodily integrity, mayhem, or 
imprisonment.
54
 The court found that in this case there was ―no warrant, 
no immediate imprisonment was possible, nor could there have been 
caused by what was said a reasonably grounded fear of restraint of 
liberty.‖55 Even though the court found that there was no evidence of 
duress on the facts of Piper, its reasoning solidified the grounds for duress 
in Ontario.
56
 
Like the plaintiffs who argued duress in Armstrong and Piper for 
confinement or threats of detention, there are several historic examples of 
courts finding duress under circumstances of unlawful confinement and 
the threat of detention. In one of the earliest cases, The Earl of 
Northumberland‘s Case of 1583, the plaintiff imprisoned the defendant 
and assigned auditors to investigate an account ―made by duress,‖ which 
acknowledged the concept.
57
 Similarly, in the 1872 case of Bromley v. 
Norton, the court examined a situation where Thomas Bromley, his wife 
Clara, and his six children were staying at a hotel in Germany for over 
three months.
58
 Mr. Bromley absconded without paying the debt, leaving 
Mrs. Bromley to answer for her husband‘s obligations.59 Mrs. Bromley 
was arrested and placed in custody for three days as a means of ―obtaining 
some security for his debt.‖60 The evidence showed that no credit was 
given to Mrs. Bromley, but only to her husband. In his decision, the Vice-
Chancellor noted that placing ―Mrs. Bromley under the custody of the 
police was a most tyrannical proceeding,‖ and that no law of any nation in 
Europe would authorize a ―hotel keeper to arrest a wife for the debt of an 
absconding husband.‖61 Mrs. Bromley was only freed because an agent of 
her father was sent from England to secure her release.
62
 Before she was 
 
 
 52. Id. para. 3. The nature of the threatened criminal action was not clearly described. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. para. 7.  
 55. Id. para. 8. 
 56. Id. para. 11. 
 57. Earl of Northumberland‘s Case, [1583] 74 Eng. Rep. 750 (Eng.). 
 58. Bromley v. Norton, (1872) 27 L.T. 478, 478 (Eng).  
 59. Id. at 478.  
 60. Id. at 479. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 478.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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let go she signed a memorandum claiming the debt as her own.
63
 The court 
found that the inn-keeper knew that the debt was not hers and that ―while 
Mrs. Bromley was under duress, he compelled her to make an 
acknowledgement which he knew to be untrue.‖64 Thus, the court saw this 
action as illegitimate pressure and did not uphold the memorandum 
because of the duress she experienced when she signed the document.
65
 
B. The History of the Criminal Defense of Duress  
Just as in the history of contractual duress, the defense at criminal law 
dates back to the Romans
66
 and ancient Hebrews.
67
 Aristotle wrote about 
compulsion and the voluntary nature of one‘s acts, saying, ―an individual 
may resist the threat and suffer the evil rather than do what he thinks to be 
wrong; he will then be praised, and his resistance will show that it was not 
inevitable that a person should submit to the threat.‖68  
Lord Matthew Hale was one of the primary theorists to discuss actions 
performed under duress or compulsion. In Pleas of the Crown, Hale stated:  
if a man can be menaced with death, unless he will commit an act of 
treason, murder or robbery, the fear of death doth not excuse him, if 
he commit the fact; for the law hath provided a sufficient remedy 
against such fears by applying himself to the courts and officers of 
justice for a writ or precept de securitate pacis.
69
  
After pointing to the institutional assistance available in the form of writ, 
Hale concludes that one needs not resort to crime, saying instead that if a 
person is  
desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and cannot otherwise 
escape, unless to satisfy his assailant‘s fury he will kill an innocent 
 
 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 58. 
 66. Eugene R. Milhizer has traced justification and excuse back for many centuries and has 
examined duress from the perspective of the Romans. See Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and 
Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 725, 
767 (2004).  
 67. Peter Rosenthal, Duress in the Criminal Law, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 199, 200 (1990) (citing S. 
MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS 30 (2d ed. 1968)). 
 68. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 625 (2d ed. 1983) (citing ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. 3, ch. 1, (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1975)). 
 69. 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE (THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN) 51 (1736) (describing a writ for someone fearing bodily harm from another, as when the 
person has been threatened with violence); see also HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).  
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person then present, the fear and actual force will not acquit him of 
the crime and punishment of murder, if he commit the fact; for he 
ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent.
70
  
Hale pointed specifically to the crimes of murder, treason and robbery as 
being excluded from the defense and that one should rather sacrifice 
oneself than commit these crimes.  
It is unclear where this list of excluded offenses identified by Hale 
originated. What is clear is that it is unrealistic to expect someone who is 
under duress to commit a crime to be able to halt the crime in order to 
apply for a writ under law to protect herself from the person pressuring her 
to commit the crime. Such a notion to apply for a writ to protect oneself 
from duress assumes that the intended crime occurs a sufficient period of 
time after the duress. However, after this ancient writ was eliminated, ―the 
exclusion of murder from the defense may be an anachronism, there being 
no clear reason why the exclusion should be maintained.‖71 One might be 
able to prove duress in the case of murder, but nonetheless there is an 
historic aversion to allow a murderer to use this defense.  
One of the earliest references to a case of duress in the common law 
was in 1321
72
 as a defense to treason,
73
 but the history of criminal duress is 
intertwined with contractual duress as the two have developed from the 
same line of cases. The legal principles of compulsion as the basis for a 
defense evolved as early as 1552 in the context of civil law when the 
courts began to grapple with the difficult question of voluntariness and the 
overborne will, and what one may do to preserve oneself. In the 1552 civil 
case of Reniger v. Fogassa,
74
 the court spoke about a defense of 
compulsion as a principle of law from which the defense of duress 
 
 
 70. HALE, supra note  69, at 51. The argument against this protection is that ―there would in all 
probability be no time or opportunity to resort to the protection of the law.‖ See Edwards, supra note 
11, at 299.  
 71. WARREN J. BROOKBANKS, THE DEFENCE OF COMPULSION AN OVERVIEW 9 (1981) 
[hereinafter BROOKBANKS, OVERVIEW]. 
 72. The case is unnamed, but referred to in the abstract by Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in the case 
of R. v. Hasan, [2005] UKHL 22 (U.K.), who stated: 
[T]he common sense starting point of the common law is that adults of sound mind are 
ordinarily to be held responsible for the crimes which they commit. To this general principle 
there has, since the 14th century, been a recognized but limited exception in favor of those 
who commit crimes because they are forced or compelled to do so against their will by the 
threats of another.  
Id. at 321.  
 73. There are a wide variety of meanings and situations that are encapsulated by the term treason. 
See, e.g., SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN: A METHODICAL SUMMARY 9–10 (P.R. 
Glazerbrook ed., 1972) (1678).  
 74. Reniger v. Fogarsa, (1550) 1 Plowd 1, 18 (Eng.). 
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developed. In that case, to prevent a vessel from sinking during a brutal 
storm the captain of the ship was forced to throw part of their shipment of 
woad
75
 overboard to save the men and other goods aboard. When he 
arrived at port with only a partial load of material, Fogassa paid a portion 
of the customs fees due and asked for time to assess the money owing on 
the uncertain amount of remaining product.  
The agreement to allow time for payment in Reniger was later 
challenged, allowing the court to comment on necessity, compulsion and 
duress. Counsel for the defendant argued that this was a situation where ―a 
man may break the words of the law, and yet not break the law itself‖ 
because of elements beyond his control.
76
 He continued that the words of 
the law will be ―broken to avoid greater inconveniences, or through 
necessity, or by compulsion . . . .‖77 The court said that there is ―a 
tempering of the rigor of the Law‖ in that ―necessitas non habet legem‖ or 
necessity does not submit to law.
78
 Thus, ―if the arm of any man is drawn 
by compulsion, and the weapon in his hand kills another, this shall not be 
Felony, or be damnified, because he did it by compulsion.‖79 The 
argument was established that if an individual is forced and compelled to 
break the law, they should not suffer the subsequent penalties. 
The development of the defense was slow during the following 
centuries, but in the 1746 case of R. v. M‘Growther80 and the 1831 case of 
R. v. Crutchley,
81
 the courts struggled with whether the defendant would 
be able to escape punishment for treasonous acts.
82
 The defendant in 
M‘Growther provided evidence that the Duke of Perth had coerced 
individuals to join ranks in the rebellion by threatening that if they did not 
join they would have their ―houses burnt‖ and their ―goods spoiled.‖83 The 
 
 
 75. A European cruciferous plant used to yield blue dye. See ROBERT E. ALLEN, THE CONCISE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (8th ed. 1990). 
 76. Reniger, 1 Plowd at 18. See Finbarr McAuley, Necessity and Duress in Criminal Law: The 
Confluence of Two Great Tributaries, 33 IR. JUR. 120, 133 (1998). This was a case where the court 
was grappling with the idea that an individual could be in technical breach of the statute, but ―did the 
best he could in the circumstances to discharge his obligations under it.‖ Id. at 133. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id at 19.  
 79. Id.  
 80. R. v. M‘Growther (1746) 168 Eng. Rep. 8 (Eng.). 
 81. R. v. Crutchley (1831) 172 Eng. Rep. 909 (Eng.). 
 82. The lack of historical cases on this subject is not simply a British or Canadian phenomenon. 
Warren Brookbanks, in his article Compulsion and Self-Defence, noted that the ―statutory defence of 
compulsion has been a part of New Zealand criminal law since 1893. During a period of nearly 100 
years the defence has remained largely unchanged, and has given rise to surprisingly little case law.‖ 
Warren Brookbanks, Compulsion and Self-Defence, 20 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 95, 96 
(1990). 
 83. M‘Growther, 168 Eng. Rep. at 8. 
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court found that these threats were ―no excuse in the eye of the law for 
joining and marching with rebels.‖84 It was found that the only crimes that 
this would excuse is  
force upon the person, and present fear of death; and this force and 
fear must continue all the time the party remains with the rebels. It 
is incumbent on every man, who makes force his defence, to shew 
[sic] an actual force, and that he quitted the service as soon as he 
could.
85
  
The court in M‘Growther disallowed the duress defense because it found 
that the accused did not take advantage of a chance for escape.
86
 That is, 
public policy concerns encouraging escape precluded application of the 
defense.
87
 Despite these concerns, the court in R. v. Crutchley, found that 
duress was successfully invoked in defense to the criminal charge of 
destruction of property, and the malicious damage to a threshing machine 
that occurred during a riot.
88
 Unlike the earlier defendants, the defendant 
Crutchley was successful because the court found that he was compelled 
to cause damage to the machines and he escaped at his first opportunity.
89
  
One of the first recorded cases where duress was argued as a defense to 
murder was in 1838 in the English case of R. v. Tyler and Price.
90
 The 
defendants asserted that they were under duress by an individual who 
called himself ―Sir William Courtenay‖ who had coerced them with 
promises of ―plenty in this world and happiness hereafter, and that he 
asserted that he was above all earthly authority, and was the Saviour of the 
world.‖91 If the individuals did not join freely, the ―Saviour‖ threatened 
them with physical harm.
92
 Lord Denman found that, where individuals 
are ―induced to join a mischievous man, it is not their fear of violence to 
themselves which can excuse their conduct to others . . . no man, from a 
 
 
 84. Id. There is a note in the English Reports version of the case that says ―if threats of this kind 
were an excuse, it would be in the power of any leader in a rebellion to indemnify all his followers.‖ 
Id. at 8. This theme was also explored by Halsbury in LAWS OF ENGLAND (Hailsham ed. 1931), cited 
in The Assizes: Shooting with Intent, 10 J. CRIM. L. 182, 183 (1946). 
 85. M‘Growther, 168 Eng. Rep. at 8. Note that the word ―excuse‖ was used. 
 86. See McAuley, supra note 76, at 165. 
 87. See Arp v. State, 12 So. 301 (Ala. 1893) (facing a situation where the defendant testified that 
he was under duress by a group of individuals).  
 88. R. v. Crutchley (1831) 172 Eng. Rep. 909, 909 (Eng.). 
 89. Id. at 909. Note that another member of the mob testified on Crutchley‘s behalf that they had 
agreed to run away and that, in fact, the witness got away from the mob after ten minutes, and the 
defendant joined him a ―quarter hour after that time.‖ 
 90. Regina v. Tyler and Price, (1838) 8 Eng. Rep. 616 (Eng.). 
 91. Id. at 643. 
 92. Id.  
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fear of consequences to himself, has a right to make himself a party to 
committing mischief on mankind.‖93 Lord Denman advised that ―it cannot 
be too often repeated, that the apprehension of personal danger does not 
furnish any excuse for assisting in doing any act which is illegal.‖94 Again, 
because the defendants did not take an opportunity for escape and because 
of the lack of evidence of imminent danger, the court disallowed the 
defense.
95
 Again, this supported the premise that one is better to sacrifice 
oneself rather than succumb to a threat.  
C. The Codification of the Canadian Criminal Defense of Duress 
After centuries of sparse decisions, the movement toward codification 
in the United Kingdom began with Thomas Babington Macaulay who first 
drafted the Indian Penal Code in 1835.
96
 This Code was enacted in 1858 
and went into effect in 1862.
97
 Jurists note that the duress defense ―might 
with advantage be abolished‖ and that the first draft of the Indian Penal 
Code in 1835 proposed to wholly eliminate the defense;
98
 however, the 
 
 
 93. Id. at 645. 
 94. Id. (citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, WILLIAM HAWKINS‘S PLEAS OF THE CROWN, bk. 1, ch. 13. 
s. 15 (1716)).  
 95. Id. at 645.  
 96. Wright, Barry, Macaulay‘s Indian Penal Code: Historical Context and Originating 
Principles, in CODIFICATION, MACAULAY AND THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 19 (Wing-Cheong Chan, 
Barry Wright & Stanley Yeo ed., 2011).  
 97. Indian Penal Code of act XLV of 1860 (Krishen Lal & Co. Law Publishers, 1929). Section 
94 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860 concerned duress and was entitled ―Act to which a person is 
compelled by threats‖ and provided that: 
Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence 
which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, 
reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the 
consequence: Provided the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a 
reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the 
situation by which he became subject to such constraint. 
 Explanation 1- A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, 
joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, 
on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence 
by law. 
 Explanation 2- A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant 
death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his 
tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the 
benefit of this exception.  
Id. 
 98. See 6 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE LAW RELATING TO 
INDICTABLE OFFENCES: WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING A DRAFT CODE EMBODYING THE 
SUGGESTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 371 (1879) [hereinafter DRAFT CODE]; Graham Parker, The 
Origins of the Canadian Criminal Code, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN LAW 249 (David 
H. Flaherty ed., 1981).  
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final draft of the Indian Code in 1860 contained a section ―more lenient 
than that originally proposed.‖99 In England, codification and its impact on 
the defense of duress culminated with a series of reports first published in 
1841. The reports criticize the unwritten and unorganized system of law 
which a common man could not decipher.
100
  
Any analysis of the duress defense in the Commonwealth inevitably 
begins with Sir James Fitzjames Stephen who was the English Secretary to 
the Council in India in the nineteenth century.
101
 Upon return from his 
post, he was ―disturbed by the lack of system in the law of his own 
country‖ and, with the support of the Attorney General, he introduced a 
Criminal Code in the English Parliament in 1878.
102
 Even before the Code, 
Stephen published extensively on duress,
103
 arguing a ―choice of evils‖ 
theory and discussing the nature of voluntary actions.
104
 His ideas about 
criminality stemmed from his beliefs on morality. Sir Stephen wrote that 
―indefinite and unscientific as the terms may be in which morality is 
expressed, the administration of criminal justice is based upon 
morality.‖105 He saw the laws of a country as reflecting this morality.  
Although Sir Stephen acknowledged that an individual could 
physically manipulate another, he believed that threat of physical harm 
was much different. Since ―even in extremis, when acting under the threat 
of death, an individual is still exercising the ability to choose whether to 
act in a particular way.‖106 Sir Stephen believed that even the ―very 
 
 
 99. See DRAFT CODE, supra note 98, at 411. Stanley Yeo has noted, in his article, Considerations 
of Time and Space in Duress, that ―[t]he defence of duress is contained in s. 94 of the Penal Code (Cap 
224, 1985 Rev. Ed.) which has remained unchanged since it first appeared in the Indian Penal Code of 
1860.‖ Stanley Yeo, Considerations of Time and Space in Duress, 16 SAC. L.J. 354, 354 (2004). 
 100. Parker, supra note 98, at 250–51. Specifically, a commission was appointed in 1840 to 
review the statute law of Upper Canada, and the later commission appointed in 1858 led to the 
Consolidated Statutes of 1859. Id. at 252. Despite the critics of the law, the English criminal code 
including the duress defense was the basis for the Canadian Criminal Code.   
 101. A.J. MacLeod & J.C. Martin, The Revision of the Criminal Code, 33 CAN. B. REV. 3, 4 
(1955).  
 102. Id. at 4.  
 103. Id. See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 
(London, MacMillan 1883) [hereinafter STEPHEN, HISTORY]; see also SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 
A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT) (3d ed. London, MacMillan 1883) 
[hereinafter STEPHEN, DIGEST]; JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW OF ENGLAND (London and Cambridge, MacMillan & Co. 1863) [hereinafter STEPHEN, 
GENERAL].  
 104. STEPHEN, GENERAL, supra note 103.  
 105. Id. at 82. 
 106. K.J.M. SMITH, JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN: PORTRAIT OF A VICTORIAN RATIONALIST 66 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). 
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strongest forms of compulsion do not exclude voluntary action.‖107 To 
illustrate his theory, Sir Stephen argued that 
a criminal walking to execution is under compulsion if any man can 
be said to be so, but his motions are just as much voluntary actions 
as if he was going to leave his place of confinement and regain his 
liberty. He walks to his death because he prefers it to being carried. 
This is choice, though it is a choice between extreme evils . . . [a] 
man is under compulsion when he is reduced to a choice of evils, 
when he is so situated that in order to escape what he dislikes most 
he must do something which he dislikes less, though he may dislike 
extremely what he determines to do.
108
 
For Sir Stephen, choice was still autonomous even if subject to severe 
compulsion.
109
  
Sir Stephen‘s attitudes toward duress were based, in part, on his 
writings in his Digest.
110
 Sir Stephen loathed to apply duress to felonies 
and said duress ―does not apply to high treason or murder. It probably 
does not apply to robbery. It applies to uttering counterfeit coin. It seems 
to apply to misdemeanors generally.‖111 Sir Stephen‘s reasoning for these 
assertions is wholly absent leading one to believe that these statements 
were purely conjecture. When speaking of duress particularly, Sir Stephen 
noted that ―hardly any branch of the law of England is more meagre [sic] 
or less satisfactory than the law on this subject.‖112 He noted that, after  
nearly thirty years‘ experience at the bar and on the bench, during 
which I have paid special attention to the administration of the 
criminal law, I never knew or heard of the defence of compulsion 
being made . . . and I have not been able to find more than two 
reported cases which bear upon it.
113
  
Sir Stephen was one of the Commissioners called upon in 1879 to 
prepare the Draft Code for England.
114
 A ―note‖ section, Section 23, is 
dedicated to compulsion.
115
 In that section, the Commissioners noted that 
 
 
 107. STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 103, at 102. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. See STEPHEN, DIGEST, supra note 103. 
 111. Id. at 23. 
 112. STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 103, at 105.  
 113. Id. at 106. This is in direct opposition to the statements made by Stephen and the 
Commission in the Draft Code. Perhaps Sir Stephen was referring to successful cases. 
 114. DRAFT CODE, supra note 98, at 371.  
 115. Id. 
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―the case of a person setting up as a defence that he was compelled to 
commit a crime is one of everyday occurrence.‖116 This statement seems to 
be in contradiction to Sir Stephen‘s comments that he had not known of a 
case of compulsion in his thirty years as a lawyer and judge. However, the 
Commission concluded by saying that ―we have framed section 23 of the 
Draft Code to express what we think is the existing law, and what at all 
events we suggest ought to be the law.‖117  
The English Draft Code received a lukewarm reception by the House 
so a Royal Commission was appointed to examine the proposal.
118
 This 
led to a revised draft bill in 1879, which died with the change of Ministry 
in 1880 and put an end to Stephen‘s attempt to codify English law.119 
However, the Commissioners noted in their Report that the common law 
defense should be retained so that no individual is deprived of a defense, 
pointing to a need for flexibility under the Draft Code.
120
  
Although the Draft Code was not adopted in England, it formed the 
basis for the Canadian Criminal Code. Section 23 of the English Draft 
Code is almost identical to the current section of the Canadian Criminal 
Code.
121
 The Canadian Code was introduced to Parliament in 1892 by Sir 
John Thompson,
122
 who was the Minister of Justice for Canada.
123
 The bill 
passed the House and received Royal Assent on July 9, 1892, and came 
into force on July 1, 1893.
124
 Many argue that there was an absence of 
detailed inquiry that one might expect for the first Criminal Code of 
Canada.
125
 Nonetheless, Canada was unquestionably on the ―forefront of 
the codification movement‖126 and ―by any standard the bill of 1891 was a 
considerable work of legal scholarship.‖127 The lack of debate on each of 
 
 
 116. Id. at 411.  
 117. Id. The Commissioners also make it clear that necessity ―should in no case be a defence.‖ Id. 
at 412.  
 118. MacLeod & Martin, supra note 101, at 4. 
 119. Id. at 4–5.  
 120. DRAFT CODE, supra note 98, at 378.  
 121. Id. at 436. The Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 12. 
 122. MacLeod & Martin, supra note 101, at 5.  
 123. Id. at 5. 
 124. Canada Bill 7, The Criminal Code, 1st Sess., 25th Parl., 1892, 55-56 Vict. c. 29, cited in 
Alan. W. Mewett, The Criminal Law, 1867–1967, 45 CAN. BAR R. 726, 728 (1967). Thompson 
introduced Bill 7 in March, 1892 with one sentence as ―there were no questions.‖ See DESMOND H. 
BROWN ED., THE BIRTH OF A CRIMINAL CODE: THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA‘S JUSTICE SYSTEM 36 
(1995).  
 125. Mewett, supra note 124, at 727. 
 126. Allan M. Linden & Patrick Fitzgerald, Recodifying Criminal Law, 66 CAN. BAR R. 529, 530 
(1987). 
 127. DESMOND H. BROWN, THE GENESIS OF THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE OF 1892, 126 
(1989). 
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the sections of the Code was because ―the minister of justice knew exactly 
what he needed in his bill to assure its smooth passage through Parliament, 
and he instructed his draftsmen accordingly.‖128 However, the idea that the 
defenses in the Code could be improved after its initial drafting was 
largely unrealized at the time.
129
 
The 1892 version of Section 23 in the English Draft Code excluded a 
total of ten offenses, and, although the origin of the list of exclusions is 
unclear,
130
 it is plausible that Canadian criminal law of the duress defense 
is the legacy of Hale and Stephen‘s personal opinions. Other than a brief 
mention by the Honorable Mr. Davies, duress was not discussed in 
Parliament.
131
 Sir Stephen‘s conclusions seem to adhere to a moral 
condemnation of a guilty person escaping just punishment rather than an 
actual examination of the case law and existing principles. Indeed, the 
restricted development of the duress defense may have been a ―reflection 
of Sir James Stephen‘s antipathy to the defence.‖132 Even though Sir 
Stephen‘s very limited view of duress was not fully reflected in the 
codification, it may account for the Canadian defense of duress ―being one 
of the most restrictive to be found and certainly narrower than the English 
common law of 1892 or today.‖133  
The codified form of the law of duress in Canada was amended in 1955 
with the introduction of the revised Criminal Code.
134
 Although this may 
have been an opportunity to amend the laws regarding duress, the relevant 
section was not substantially altered. Instead of engaging in a meaningful 
discussion of the defense of duress, the Honorable Stuart S. Garson simply 
replied that the current legislation ―stood the test of time‖ and that they 
would not change the law purely for the sake of change.
135
 The defense of 
duress was slowly developing through case law,
136
 but there were very few 
 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. OFFICIAL DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF THE DOMINION OF CANADA 2711 (May 
17, 1892) (statement of Mr. Davies). 
 132. Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 202. 
 133. STUART, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 463. 
 134. The 1955 Code was substantially shorter with 753 sections, compared with the more than 
1,100 in the previous Code; with 289 pages rather than 418 pages in the Revised Statutes of 1927. 
MacLeod & Martin, supra note 102, at 11. 
 135. OFFICIAL DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF THE DOMINION OF CANADA 1256 (Jan. 
19, 1954) (statement of Mr. Garson). 
 136. 6 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE LAW RELATING TO 
INDICTABLE OFFENCES: WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING A DRAFT CODE EMBODYING THE 
SUGGESTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 226 (1879). This report is also available in the appendix of the 
Senate Hansard, May 14, 1952. 
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cases that used this defense during this time period, and even fewer that 
were successful.
137
  
It is important to note that the 1892 Canadian Criminal Code 
maintained an important underlying principle: the common law defenses 
were not superseded by the Code.
138
 Although the court would eventually 
find that there was an ―uneasy tension in some cases between 
interpretation of a detailed statutory provision and application of a 
common law defence,‖139 the result was the availability of the common 
law defense, and the ability to call on the common law in certain 
circumstances where the codified defense was too restrictive. This would 
allow the case law to dictate what the defense would look like.
140
 The 
framers of the Canadian Code wanted to preserve the flexibility in the use 
of duress,
141
 and arguably they made a political decision in their 
codification choices.
142
 The bottom line is that even though duress is 
clearly important to the justice system, little thought was given to the 
codified defense at the time of the inception of the Canadian Criminal 
Code, despite opportunities to do so, but the common law defense was still 
available leading to this duality of the modern criminal defense.  
II. THE DEFINITIONS AND MODERN FORMS OF DURESS 
A. The Definition of Contractual Duress  
Contractual duress advanced significantly in the Commonwealth with 
the foundational Australian case of Barton v. Armstrong.
143
 This 1976 
Privy Council case involved some of the clearest forms of an individual 
under duress that is found in any of the Commonwealth countries. In this 
case the chairman, Armstrong, exerted pressure on the managing director 
of a company, Barton, to sign deeds. Barton eventually brought an action 
to say that a deed that he had signed was executed under duress and that it 
 
 
 137. For example, see the Quebec decision in Rex v. Farduto, [1912] 10 D.L.R. 669 (Can. Que.). 
See also Dunbar v. The King, [1936] 4 D.L.R. 737 (Can.).  
 138. This provision continues today. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 8(3).  
 139. STUART, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 452. 
 140. Even Stephen noted the importance of the common law defenses, noted in commentary to the 
Draft Code, as cited by G.L. Williams, Necessity, CRIM. L. REV. 128, 129–30 (1978). 
 141. DESMOND H. BROWN ED., THE BIRTH OF A CRIMINAL CODE: THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA‘S 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 126 (1995).  
 142. As for the alternative, ―some ‗Codes‘ were introduced in the United States, but the 
Benthamite-Austinian concept of a Code which would supplant the common law and provide a totally 
new approach, ‗a fundamental rethinking of the law‘ was ‗never more than an ideal.‘‖ Parker, supra 
note 98, at 249. 
 143. Barton v Armstrong (1975) 2 W.L.R. 1050 (P.C.) (Austl.). 
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was voidable in relation to his part of the deal.
144
 Lord Scarman succinctly 
summarized the contractual elements involved and the lack of precedent 
on point: ―A threatens B with death if he does not execute some document 
and B, who takes A‘s threats seriously, executes the document it can be 
only in the most unusual circumstances that there can be any doubt 
whether the threats operated to induce him to execute the document.‖145 
To support this theory, the court was provided with significant evidence of 
duress. 
During the fifty-six day trial, Barton alleged that Armstrong threatened 
him in numerous ways including statements that he would have him 
murdered.
146
 Barton alleged that Armstrong made the statement, among 
others, that the ―city is not as safe as you may think between office and 
home. You will see what I can do against you and you will regret the day 
when you decided not to work with me.‖147 For months, Barton received 
calls at 4:00 and 5:00 in the morning five consecutive nights at a time with 
heavy breathing and occasionally a voice saying ―[y]ou will be killed.‖148 
Barton eventually recognized this voice as Armstrong‘s and, indeed, the 
trial court found that Armstrong was responsible for these calls.
149
 The 
court also found that Armstrong said ―I will show you what I can do 
against you and you had better watch out. You can get killed,‖ and that 
Armstrong told Barton that he had the support of the police, organized 
crime was growing, and $2,000 would be sufficient remuneration for 
killing him.
150
 In direct relation to the contract, Barton relayed that 
Armstrong said ―[y]ou had better sign this agreement—or else‖ and 
―[u]nless you sign this document I will get you killed.‖151  
However, the trial court did not find that all of these threats alleged 
were made. The trial court explained its mixed findings saying: ―on many 
occasions [Armstrong] had threatened Barton with death, and that Barton 
was justified in taking [sic] and did take these threats seriously‖ but while 
Barton was in ―fear for the safety of himself and his family, these threats 
and the fear engendered by them did not in fact coerce him into entering 
into the agreement.‖152  
 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1060. 
 146. Id. at 1055.  
 147. Id. at 1056. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Barton v Armstrong (1975) 2 W.L.R. 1050, 1056 (P.C.) (Austl.). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1057. 
 152. Id. at 1055. 
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On appeal, all three judges of the Court of Appeal found that 
Armstrong made threats that were ―intended by him to induce and were 
understood by Barton to be intended to induce him to enter into the 
agreement.‖153 In Barton, Lord Scarman adopted the reasoning in Reynell 
v. Spyre
154
 in that if there is anything like deception involved, a contract 
cannot stand, and that the same principle should apply to duress: if 
―Armstrong‘s threats were ‗a‘ reason for Barton‘s executing the deed he is 
entitled to relief even though he might well have entered into the contract 
if Armstrong had uttered no threats to induce him to do so.‖155 Thus, 
duress need only be a factor, not the only factor, that leads an individual to 
sign a contract under duress.
156
 Later, the New Zealand court in Pharmacy 
Care adopted similar reasoning saying that ―[i]t is not necessary to show 
that duress was the sole cause inducing the agreement. It is enough if it 
was ‗an‘ inducement of the requisite character.‖157 In Barton, the court 
also held that, once the defendant establishes that duress existed, ―the 
burden is placed upon the party issuing the threat to establish that the 
threat did not contribute to the decision to enter into the agreement.‖158  
The widely-accepted modern definition of contractual duress comes 
from Lord Scarman in the 1983 British case of Universe Tankships Inc. of 
Monrovia v. International Transport Workers Federation.
159
 Lord 
Scarman said there are two elements to contractual duress including ―(1) 
pressure amounting to compulsion of the will; and (2) the illegitimacy of 
the pressure exerted.‖160 One must first examine the consent of the 
complainant and the pressure that impairs the decision-making of that 
individual as the ―defendant must have behaved in a way which makes the 
pressure affecting the complainant‘s consent to be regarded as illegitimate 
. . . it is the combination of the two elements that constitute duress.‖161 The 
court in Universe Tankships stated that the nature of the pressure will 
 
 
 153. Id. at 1059. 
 154. Reyell v. Spree,(1852) 1 De GM & G 660, 708 (Eng.). 
 155. Barton v Armstrong (1975) 2 W.L.R. 1050, 1061 (P.C.) (Austl.). 
 156. JOHN MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 370 (2005). 
 157. Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd. v Att‘y General [2004] CA 198/03 para. 90 (N.Z.).  
 158. MCCAMUS, supra note 156, at 370. See section below on burden of proof. 
 159. Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. International Transport Workers‘ Federation, [1983] 1 
A.C. 366, 400 (H.L.) (Eng.). 
 160. Universe Tankships of Monrovia, 1 A.C. at 400; see also Rick Bigwood, Coercion in 
Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 201, 208 (1996) [hereinafter 
Bigwood, Coercion]. For the purposes of this Article, all references to situations that could be 
considered ordinary ―commercial pressure‖ will be eliminated. This Article is concerned only with 
those situations which can be considered falling wholly within the realm of duress in its most serious 
form. See id. at 203. 
 161. ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 8. 
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often be easily defined as illegitimate, but this is not always the case.
162
 
When the pressure is clearly decisive, one needs to be absolved from the 
―normal moral or legal consequences of one‘s actions. Hence, as a result 
of coercion . . . contracts are not binding: the ‗consent‘ brought to them is 
treated in law as revocable.‖163 The law reflects these arguments: proven 
contractual duress is a vitiating defense when the pressure is clearly 
decisive.
164
  
There has been much written on the issue of whether a contract is void 
or voidable when completed under duress. Many judges have sought to 
treat the agreements as voidable rather than ―void ab initio,‖ or void from 
the moment a contract is entered into, so that the aggrieved party can 
choose whether or not to enforce the contract.
165
 Lord Simon of Glaisdale 
stated in the decision in Lynch v. D.P.P. of Northern Ireland, that duress 
―again deflects, without destroying, the will of one of the contracting 
parties . . . . The contract procured by duress is therefore not void: it is 
voidable—at the discretion of the party subject to duress.‖166 As noted by 
Justice Hammond in Pharmacy Care, however, if ―duress is to be asserted, 
it may be lost by affirmation.‖167 In North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd. v. 
Hyundai the court cites Chitty on Contracts saying that a  
person who has entered into a contract under duress, may either 
affirm or avoid such contract after the duress has ceased; and if he 
has so voluntarily acted under it with a full knowledge of all the 
circumstances he may be held bound on the ground of ratification, 
or if, after escaping from the duress, he takes no steps to set aside 
the transaction, he may be found to have affirmed it.
168
  
 
 
 162. Id. at 11. 
 163. Bigwood, Coercion, supra note 160, at 204. 
 164. See Hamish Stewart, A Formal Approach to Contractual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 175, 
177 (1997). He notes that while  
both duress and unconscionability will often be present in a given fact situation . . . they are 
logically distinct aspects of contractual unfreedom. Further, contacts may be unenforceable 
for other reasons, also logically distinct from duress, such as undue influence, fraud, mistake, 
and frustration; and contracts may be unenforceable for reasons unrelated to consent, for 
example, when they are illegal or contrary to public policy. While these other reasons may 
well have to do with freedom in a larger sense, they are not instances of coercion or duress, 
and to describe them as such is misleading. Id.  
For the purposes of this Article, duress, which is distinct from the related concepts of undue influence 
and unconscionability, is the only element examined.  
 165. MCCAMUS, supra note 156, at 368. 
 166. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 (H.L.) [670] (appeal taken from N. Ir.). 
 167. Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd. v Att‘y Gen. [2004] CA 198/03 para. 97 (N.Z.).  
 168. North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd., [1979] Q.B. 705, 720 
(Eng.) (citing JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS COMMENTARIES 207 (24th ed. 1977)). See also 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] CANADIAN CONTRACTUAL AND CRIMINAL DURESS 237 
 
 
 
 
One consequence of making contracts voidable rather than void is that 
third parties have a greater chance for protection for any reasonable 
reliance on a contract formed under duress.
169
 The victim may assert 
duress as a defense to a breach action or void a contract by starting an 
action for rescission at a reasonable time after the threat has ended.
170
  
The case law indicates that economic pressure renders the contract not 
only voidable but also actionable as a tort for damages.
171
 In Universe 
Tankships, Lord Scarman noted that the law of civil duress was comprised 
of illegitimate pressure to the victim:  
[The] practical effect of [these elements] is compulsion or the 
absence of choice. Compulsion is variously described in the 
authorities as coercion or the vitiation of consent. The classic case 
of duress is, however, not the lack of will to submit but the victim‘s 
intentional submission arising from the realisation that there is no 
other practical choice open to him.
172
 
In addition to this definition, the pressure must be such that the law views 
it as wrongful which Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of Glaisdale aptly 
noted in their dissent in the case of Barton v. Armstrong.
173
 The court in 
Attorney-General for England and Wales v. R. added to this definition of 
contractual defense saying that all cases of duress involve the ―but for‖ test 
that without this pressure they would not have entered into the contract.
174
 
That pressure can come in various forms ―to the person or to economic 
 
 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 443 n.1, noting that although there are provisions for threats to third 
parties in contract law the  
victim can still avoid the contract against the other party unless that party in good faith and 
without reason to know of the duress either gives value or relies materially on the contract. In 
that case the other party is protected for reasons analogous to those that apply to the good 
faith purchaser.  
 169. MCCAMUS, supra note 156, at 368–69. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 431 n.2, who 
makes the point that a ―void contract‖ is not a contract. He also notes that duress ―renders the 
obligation of the party a nullity‖ and is a ―real defence to an asserted obligation on a negotiable 
instrument, i.e., a good even when the instrument is in the hands of a good faith purchaser (known as a 
‗holder in due course.‘).‖ Id. 
 170. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 443. 
 171. See Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. International Transport Workers‘ Federation, [1983] 
1 A.C. 366, 400 (H.L.) (Eng.); see also Barton v Armstrong [1975] 2 W.L.R. 1050 (P.C.) (Austl.), and 
Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long [1980] A.C. 614 (P.C.) (Eng.).  
 172. Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. International Transport Workers‘ Federation, [1983] 1 
A.C. 366, 400 (H.L.) (Eng.). This case involved the use of a trust set up by a trade union for the needs 
of the crew on a ship registered in Liberia but docked in Britain.  
 173. Barton v. Armstrong, 2 W.L.R. 1050, para. 19.  
 174. Att‘y Gen. for Eng. & Wales v R., [2002] 2 NZLR 91(CA) ¶ 61, aff‘d in [2003] UKPC 22, 
[2004] 2 NZLR 577 (P.C.).  
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interests and can also involve social, professional or moral elements. The 
pressure may be direct or indirect, and its impact requires an examination 
of the circumstances in which the party under pressure is situated as a 
result of the pressure.‖175 Thus, the threat can be inferred by speech or by 
the behavior of the individual in question.
176
 This definition allows for a 
very broad interpretation of what comes within the realm of duress in civil 
law, and covers a very large range of conduct. 
B. Modern Contractual Duress 
One of the most recent pronouncements on civil duress in the 
Commonwealth is in the 2004 New Zealand case of Pharmacy Care 
Systems Ltd. v. Attorney General, which both endorsed and expanded upon 
the test of Universe Tankships.
177
 Pharmacy Care expanded the test to a 
seven-part ―elements of duress‖ test: 
First, there must be a threat or pressure. Secondly, that threat or 
pressure must be improper. Thirdly, the victim‘s will must have 
been overborne by the improper pressure so that his or her free will 
and judgment have been displaced. Fourthly, the threat or pressure 
must actually induce the victim‘s manifestation of assent. Fifthly, 
the threat or pressure must be sufficiently grave to justify the assent 
from the victim, in the sense that it left the victim no reasonable 
alternative. Sixthly, duress renders the resulting agreement voidable 
at the instance of the victim . . . Seventhly, the victim may be 
precluded from avoiding the agreement by affirmation.
178
 
Even though the plaintiff Pharmacy Care met the elements of the elaborate 
test created by the court, it lost on the issue of duress because it did not 
quickly seek to rescind the deed.
179
 Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court 
of New Zealand was refused on the basis that the ―law of New Zealand on 
the subject of duress is sufficiently clear and settled.‖180 While it had been 
unclear how widely this new expanded test would be used, the Court of 
Appeal for New Zealand recently commented on this expanded test in 
 
 
 175. Id.  
 176. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 431. 
 177. Pharmacy Care Sys. Ltd. v Att‘y Gen. [2004] CA 198/03 (N.Z.). 
 178. Id. para. 98. 
 179. Id. para. 112. 
 180. Rick Bigwood, When Exegesis Becomes Excess: The Newborn Problematics of Contractual 
Duress in New Zealand, 21 J. CONT. L. 208, 209–10 (2005). Bigwood objects to this as Attorney-
General is an English case. 
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McIntyre v. Nemesis DBK Ltd.
181
 In that case, the court said that what was 
set down as ―elements‖ of duress were actually only ―legal propositions of 
relevance to duress.‖182 After the seven-part element test was criticized as 
unworkable, the court instead endorsed the Universe Tankships test.
183
 
With this clarification, the law of contract remains broad and relatively 
simple today. 
C. Definition of Criminal Duress 
The current state of the criminal law defense of duress is much more 
complicated and unclear than its counterpart in the law of contract. While 
duress is ―of venerable antiquity and wide extent,‖184 it has proven to be an 
―elusive juristic concept‖185 as it is difficult to trace its uncertain history 
with relatively few reported cases and a vague and unstable foundation.
186
 
The imprecise and overlapping definitions of ―duress,‖ ―coercion‖ and 
―compulsion‖ has done little to rectify the problem. Instead, the 
interchangeable usage of the terms add to the confusion of their meaning:  
[c]ompulsion . . . appears to be the expression first used in the 
context of overbearing threats which induce criminally proscribed 
actions and is the expression commonly used by the common law 
commentators . . . . Duress however, is the term preferred by 
Blackstone and is now widely used in Anglo-American law. Both 
expressions, however, continue to be used interchangeably in the 
case-law ‗without definition, and regardless that in some cases the 
legal usage is a term of art differing from popular usage.‘187 
The current codified version of the defense is found in Section 17 of 
the Canadian Criminal Code: 
17. A person who commits an offence under compulsion by threats 
of immediate death or bodily harm from a person who is present 
when the offence is committed is excused for committing the 
offence if the person believes that the threats will be carried out and 
if the person is not a party to a conspiracy or association whereby 
the person is subject to compulsion, but this section does not apply 
 
 
 181. McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd. [2010] 1 NZLR 463 (CA) (N.Z.).  
 182. Id. para. 22. 
 183. Id. para. 25.  
 184. R. v. Howe & Burke, [1987] A.C. 417 at 428 (H.L.) per Lord Hailsham L.C. 
 185. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 (H.L.) [686].  
 186. BROOKBANKS, OVERVIEW, supra note 71, at 5.  
 187. Id. 
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where the offence that is committed is high treason or treason, 
murder, piracy, attempted murder, sexual assault, sexual assault 
with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm, 
aggravated sexual assault, forcible abduction, hostage taking, 
robbery, assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm, aggravated 
assault, unlawfully causing bodily harm, arson or an offence under 
sections 280 to 283 (abduction and detention of young persons).
188
 
The codified defense of duress in Canada is undeniably restrictive, and it 
could be reasoned that this is so because a successful defense of duress 
results in a complete acquittal.  
Alternatively, in R. v. Ruzic, Justice LeBel found several factors that 
comprise the common law defense. The first factor was a safe avenue of 
escape judged on the objective-subjective standard of a reasonable person 
similarly situated.
189
 Second, the court found that proportionality was an 
element of the common law defense, again measured on the standard 
according to a reasonable person similarly situated.
190
 Third, the court in 
Ruzic established that, in relation to the threat, the ―accused should be 
expected to demonstrate some fortitude and to put up a normal resistance 
to the threat. The threat must be to the personal integrity of the person.‖191 
Justice LeBel also voiced the need for a court to instruct a jury that there 
was a real threat affecting the accused at the time of the offense and the 
―need for a close temporal connection between the threat and the harm 
threatened.‖192 The accused must raise the defense and introduce some 
evidence, and the court must determine if it has an ―air of reality.‖193 The 
court found that those who are parties rather than perpetrators to the 
statutorily excluded offenses, such as aiders or abettors, will continue to be 
able to use the common law defense because the two groups are treated 
differently under Canadian law.
194
 This common law definition of the 
defense is much more expansive than the codified version.  
 
 
 188. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 17; Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 40. 
 189. R. v. Ruzic [1998], 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 61 (Can.). 
 190. Id. para. 62. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. para. 96. 
 193. Id. para. 100. 
 194. See R. v. Paquette, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 189 (Can.). 
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D. Modern Criminal Duress 
The pivotal Canadian Supreme Court decision in R. v. Ruzic
195
 
surveyed the troubled history of criminal duress. Justice LeBel, writing for 
the Court, acknowledged the concerns Justice Lamer expressed a few 
years earlier in the Supreme Court case R. v. Hibbert:
196
 ―the law relating 
to duress has been plagued, nonetheless, with some uncertainties and 
inconsistencies since the beginning of its development. This is 
understandable. Duress involves the resolution of conflicts between 
individual rights and duties to others or obligations as a citizen.‖197 The 
call for a universal analysis of duress was overdue, and many theorists 
were hopeful that Ruzic would answer the fundamental questions about the 
defense. The Supreme Court noted in Ruzic that, ―[i]n the realm of 
criminal law, the courts routinely review the definition of criminal 
offenses to ensure conformity with Charter rights.‖198 When examining 
Charter challenges to defenses, however, the cases are ―rare and had never 
been successful before the Supreme Court until Ruzic.‖199 The need for 
certainty and a solution to the problem of duress was required. To 
understand the modern form of this defense, it is important to have an 
understanding of this case and why it has prompted renewed interest in 
duress.  
In Ruzic, Marijana Ruzic was charged with importing two kilograms of 
heroin into Canada on April 29, 1994, valued approximately at $1 million 
Canadian dollars,
200
 in violation of Section 5(1) of the Narcotic Control 
Act.
201
 Ruzic was also charged with the possession and use of a false 
passport in violation of Section 368 of the Criminal Code.
202
 Ruzic 
testified that she was forced to bring the drugs to Canada or her mother in 
Belgrade in the former Yugoslavia would be harmed or even killed.
203
 She 
testified that a man named Mirko Mirkovic knew personal information 
about the accused and approached Ruzic on several occasions.
204
 He 
claimed to know that Ruzic‘s mother was ill and that they lived 
 
 
 195. R. v. Ruzic [1998], 1 S.C.R. 687 (Can.). 
 196. R. v. Hibbert [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 (Can.). 
 197. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 58 (Can.).  
 198. Id. para. 22.  
 199. Yeo, supra note 19, at 335, 339. An important element in Ruzic was the discussion of moral 
involuntariness, but a full discussion of this element is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 200. Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 6.  
 201. R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1. 
 202. Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 2. 
 203. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 5 (Can.).  
 204. Id. para. 4.  
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together.
205
 Ruzic, who was only 21 years old at the time, was the sole 
caretaker for her mother, and did not want to cause her mother concern.
206
 
She testified that she felt she could not seek the assistance of the police in 
Belgrade because of their potential involvement with criminal 
organizations: ―[P]eople die in the streets. We don‘t have a law; it‘s 
corruption. And the crime it‘s very high and so people are afraid.‖207 In 
Belgrade, Mirkovic showed Ruzic a knife and said that he liked to ―cut 
people.‖208 He started sexually touching the defendant and told her that he 
would like to have sex with Ruzic and her mother.
209
 The violence 
escalated, and Mirkovic burned the defendant with a lighter and injected 
her with a needle of a substance that she believed to be heroin.
210
 
Mirkovic strapped three packages of heroin to Ruzic‘s body and told 
her that she had to travel to Canada with the drugs or he would ―do 
something to her mother.‖211 Upon entering the country, Ruzic lied to 
Canadian immigration officers, but eventually the packages of heroin were 
discovered in her possession.
212
 At trial, defense counsel argued that Ruzic 
did not meet the ―immediacy‖ or ―presence‖ requirements of Section 17, 
which had been restrictively interpreted until this point; they hoped to use 
the more inclusive interpretation in the common law provision.
213
 The 
defense thus sought a declaration that Section 17 violated Section 7 of the 
Charter and that it was not saved by Section 1
214
 because the aggressor 
was not present with the threatened party, the threat was to a third party, 
and there was not an immediate threat to the victim. 
The trial judge ruled that Section 17 did violate the Charter and 
instructed the jury on the common law defense of duress.
215
 Ruzic was 
acquitted of both charges on December 9, 1994.
216
 At the Court of Appeal, 
Justice Laskin, writing for the unanimous court, agreed with the trial judge 
that Section 17 violated the Charter because it infringed Section 7 and was 
 
 
 205. Id. para. 3.  
 206. Id. para. 7.  
 207. Id. para. 16. 
 208. Id. para. 20. 
 209. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 20 (Can.).  
 210. Id. paras. 22–24. 
 211. Id. para. 25.  
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. para. 39. 
 214. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11; 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).  
 215. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 1 (Can.).  
 216. Id. paras. 2–3. 
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not saved by Section 1.
217
 The court declared Section 17 of no force or 
effect ―to the extent that it prevents an accused from relying on the 
common law defense of duress preserved by section 8 (3) of the Code.‖218 
Accordingly, the Crown‘s appeal was dismissed, and the case went to the 
Supreme Court. Justice LeBel, writing for the unanimous court, 
articulated: 
[a]lthough moral involuntariness
219
 does not negate the actus reus or 
mens rea of an offence, it is a principle which, similarly to physical 
involuntariness, deserves protection under s. 7 of the Charter. It is a 
principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct—
behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, 
unhindered by external constraints—should attract the penalty and 
stigma of criminal liability. Depriving a person of liberty and 
branding her with the stigma of criminal liability would infringe the 
principles of fundamental justice if the accused did not have 
any realistic choice. The ensuing deprivation of liberty and stigma 
would have been imposed in violation of the tenets of fundamental 
justice and would thus infringe s. 7 of the Charter.
220
 
The court used this reasoning to strike down the ―immediacy‖ and 
―presence‖ requirements of Section 17 of the Criminal Code. As Justice 
LeBel noted in the decision ―[t]he plain meaning of s. 17 is quite 
restrictive in scope. Indeed, the section seems tailor-made for the situation 
in which a person is compelled to commit an offence at gun point.‖221 As 
this language shows, the defense is more nuanced than the restrictive 
paradigmatic example provided in Ruzic. Not every case involves a 
gunman who is present and threatening immediate force. 
However, the unfortunate result of Ruzic is that it has ―allowed moral 
involuntariness to require an acquittal even when the accused‘s behaviour 
is morally blameworthy.‖222 Thus, it may be possible that someone who 
acted in a morally involuntary way but who was morally blameworthy 
would nonetheless be acquitted.
223
 This finding does not accord with the 
 
 
 217. Id. para. 14. 
 218. Id. para. 109. 
 219. The concept of moral involuntariness is a fundamental concept that will be discussed in detail 
later in the text. 
 220. Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687 para. 47. 
 221. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 50 (Can.).  
 222. Stephen G. Coughlan, Duress, Necessity, Self-Defence and Provocation: Implications of 
Radical Change, 7 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 196 (2001). 
 223. The court also cited Dennis Klimchuk who states that ―normatively involuntary actions share 
with actions that are involuntary in the sense relevant to negating actus reus the exculpatorily relevant 
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principle formed in past cases that there should not be a focus on the actus 
reus or mens rea in order to analyze duress.
224
 The court in Ruzic decided 
to base the defense on an extremely tenuous foundation. Instead of taking 
the opportunity to clarify the defense and square it with the lower court‘s 
conception of duress, the court raised more questions.  
The fundamental basis of the decision is that the Supreme Court 
created this new principle of fundamental justice because they were 
worried about the ramifications of equating moral involuntariness with 
moral innocence: they denied that morally involuntary behaviour is 
necessarily not blameworthy. Their fear was that to identify the two would 
have unintended consequences for the justice system.
225
  
It seems that ―in their haste to keep the cap on the toothpaste, the 
Supreme Court may have cut the bottom off the tube.‖226 Again, as seen 
below,
227
 Ruzic left open the issue of whether the excluded offenses in 
Section 17 remain and how they may be removed by Parliament or the 
courts.
228
 So far, this question has remained unanswered. Although the 
court softened the defense of duress in Ruzic, the defense remains very 
confusing.
229
 Stanley Yeo argues that although the Supreme Court made 
the concept of moral involuntariness a principle of fundamental justice, it 
―lacks sufficient constraint and is too imprecise to qualify as a principle of 
fundamental justice.‖230  
The decision in Ruzic was not clear on whether Section 17 was 
completely struck down or if only the two portions—presence and 
immediacy—were impacted. Justice LeBel stated, ―I prefer to ground the 
partial striking down of s. 17 on the fundamental principle that criminal 
liability should not be ascribed to physically or morally involuntary 
behaviour.‖231 The reference to ―partial striking down‖ is ambiguous, and 
it is not clear whether the court intended to strike down only the presence 
and immediacy requirements (thus addressing only the specific questions 
 
 
feature that renders the latter immune from criminal censure, namely, that involuntary actions resist 
imputation to the actor putatively responsible for their commission.‖ Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. para. 46. 
 224. See R. v. Hibbert [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 where the Supreme Court made it clear that duress did 
not affect the actus reus nor the mens rea of the offense apart from exceptional circumstances.  
 225. Coughlan, supra note 222, at 149.  
 226. Id.  
 227. See Dennis Klimchuk, Moral Innocence, Normative Involuntariness, and Fundamental 
Justice, 18 CRIM. REP. 96, 104–05 (1998).  
 228. STUART, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 457 (citing Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 91, where 
Justice Laskin uses R. v. Rodriguez, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 as authority).  
 229. Don Stuart, ‗Moral Involuntariness‘ Becomes Charter Standard for Defences, 41 CRIM. REP. 
37, 42 (2001).  
 230. Yeo, supra note 19, at 335. 
 231. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 93 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] CANADIAN CONTRACTUAL AND CRIMINAL DURESS 245 
 
 
 
 
before the court) or whether the court intended to go further and to strike 
down the whole of the first part of Section 17 and to substitute the 
common law defense for that portion of Section 17. The very recent case 
of R. v. Ryan
232
 below indicates that this has not been the result. 
However, the analysis in Ruzic is consistent with the hypothesis that 
courts are trying to take into account the intent of the earliest framers of 
the law, who suggested that duress was not meant to be entirely codified: 
[T]o strike down only a portion of the defense is more complex. If 
we were literally only to partly strike down the defense, by 
removing the imminence and presence requirements, then we would 
be left with a section that allows anyone to invoke duress when they 
act under compulsion by threats. It is clear that this is not the 
Court‘s intention, and that they want some restrictions on what sort 
of threats will be required. Their intention is to read into the statute 
the more relaxed common law standard . . . . But this intent would 
be made much clearer if the Court actually spoke in Ruzic about 
‗reading in‘, rather than simply about ‗striking down.‘233 
It seems as if the court meant the test of duress was meant to be flexible, 
and a new, more flexible standard should now be adopted.
234
 This 
approach seems to be consistent with the most recent Canadian criminal 
case to come through the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. 
R. v. Ruzic attempted to answer some of the questions inherent in 
duress. One of the most important findings was that the common law 
version of the defense had ―freed itself from the constraints of immediacy 
and presence and thus appears more consonant with the values of the 
Charter‖235 and acknowledged that the common law defense was an 
important part of the criminal law of Canada.  
The court found that with respect to future harm the 
―underinclusiveness‖ of the duress defense in Section 17 infringes on the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person protected under Section 7 of 
the Charter ―because the immediacy and presence requirements exclude 
threats of future harm to the accused or to third parties. It risks 
jeopardizing the liberty and security interests protected by the Charter, in 
violation of the basic principles of fundamental justice.‖236 Upholding the 
 
 
 232. R. v. Ryan (2011), 301 NSR (2d) 255 (Nova Scotia Court of Appeal). 
 233. Coughlan, supra note 222, n.33. 
 234. See discussion supra Part I.  
 235. Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 56.  
 236. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 90 (Can.).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
246 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:215 
 
 
 
 
Charter, future harm was identified as an important element to preserve 
within the common law defense.
237
 The court, however, noted that, in the 
future, the ―trial judge should instruct the jury clearly on the components 
of this defense including the need for a close temporal connection between 
the threat and the harm threatened.‖238 The Supreme Court permitted 
future harm within a time limitation.  
In Ruzic, Justice LeBel also found that standard of immediacy is less 
strict in the common law defense. He stated that, although the defense 
requires the person imposing duress require ―immediate‖ action by the 
defendant, this immediacy requirement has been ―interpreted in a flexible 
manner by Canadian jurisprudence and also as appears from the 
development of the common law in other Commonwealth countries, more 
particularly Great Britain and Australia.‖239 Instead of the strict presence 
and immediacy requirements of Section 17, the common law simply 
provides for a ―close connection in time, between the threat and its 
execution in such a manner that the accused loses the ability to act 
freely.‖240 If this temporal connection is absent it would be doubtful that 
the individual could argue he or she did not have a safe avenue of escape. 
While there is much debate on the individual elements of this definition, 
these considerations seem to be the current test employed by Canadian 
courts. Still, as Coughlan has noted, ―there is murkiness below the 
surface.‖241  
The duress defense continues to evolve. Although the list of excluded 
offenses to which the duress defense is unavailable seems unaffected by 
the Ruzic decision, at least one court has permitted a defendant to claim 
the duress defense in robbery even though robbery is listed as one of the 
twenty-two excluded offenses.
242
  
Finally it must be noted that the future use of the common law defense 
of duress is not without problems. Some commentators have noted that 
even if ―s. 17 is constitutionally invalid, it does not follow that the 
common law is constitutionally valid if, as it stands, it too would allow for 
 
 
 237. Id. para. 73.  
 238. Id. para. 96. 
 239. Id. para. 65. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Coughlan, supra note 222, at 160. 
 242. After Ruzic, the excluded offense of robbery was successfully challenged and the court 
acquitted the accused and allowed a duress defense. R. v. Fraser, (2002), 3 C.R. (6th) 308 (Can. N.S. 
Prov. Ct.). In the Nova Scotia Provincial Court, it was found that ―Section 17 of the Criminal Code, at 
least in relation to the offence of robbery, was in violation of s. 7 of the Charter [of Rights and 
Freedoms] and was declared inoperative. Therefore, the common law defence of duress was 
applicable.‖ Id. 
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the conviction of a person who is ‗morally innocent.‘‖243 Thus, by simply 
finding Section 17 unconstitutional, questions remain about the common 
law and how to ensure that the same constitutional challenge does not 
occur under any new common law formulation of duress.  
A very recent case has sought to clarify the statutory law of duress. In 
R. v. Ryan,
244
 the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal had the opportunity to 
discuss the confusing nature of duress which was, again, commented to be 
―a rather confusing amalgam of statutory and common law.‖245 This case 
has very unique facts. The defendant, Ms. Ryan, decided that after a life of 
―constant abuse at the hands of her husband,‖ to contract an individual to 
murder her husband.
246
 She in fact contracted with an undercover 
R.C.M.P. officer, and was charged with counseling to commit murder 
under the Criminal Code.
247
 The trial judge and the Court of Appeal both 
outlined a life of domestic violence where Ms. Ryan feared for her life and 
the life of her daughter during her husband‘s ―reign of terror,‖ and lived in 
―constant terror.‖248 Mr. Ryan described to his wife how he would kill her 
and their young daughter and then he would bury them behind where they 
lived.
249
 Ms. Ryan called the police more than nine times, spoke to Victim 
Services approximately 11 times, and attempted to obtain a peace bond to 
no avail.
250
 
The Court of Appeal evaluated whether the defense of duress would 
apply in this non-traditional situation because the defense of self-defense 
would not apply because Ms. Ryan contracted someone else to carry out 
the act of murder. Although the Court of Appeal asked whether the 
―defence of duress [could] go where it had never gone before,‖ they 
concluded that Ms. Ryan had no way out, and that the defense should not 
be limited simply because it could not ―fit neatly into the traditional 
parameters of one of our enumerated defences.‖251 The court determined 
that Ms. Ryan was the principal to the offense rather than a party, and her 
offense was not one of the excluded offenses in Section 17; therefore, she 
would come within the codified defense.  
 
 
 243. Patrick Healy, Innocence and Defences, 19 CRIM. REP. 121, 126 (1993).  
 244. R. v. Ryan (2011), 301 NSR (2d) 255. 
 245. Id. para. 76. 
 246. Id. para. 1, 4. 
 247. Id. para. 1.  
 248. Id. paras 10, 29. 
 249. Id. para. 40. 
 250. R. v. Ryan (2011), 301 NSR (2d) 255, paras. 46, 48, 50. A peace bond is commonly referred 
to as a restraining order. 
 251. Id. paras. 73–74. 
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The Court of Appeal first analyzed the safe avenue of escape and the 
immediacy and presence requirements, and went back to the Supreme 
Court decision in Ruzic. Extraordinarily, the court in Ruzic actually 
references this type of situation where a battered woman may use the 
duress defense when coerced by her spouse to commit a crime. The court 
specifically noted that  
Even though her partner is not present when she commits the 
offence and is therefore unable to execute it immediately, a battered 
woman may believe nonetheless that she has no safe avenue of 
escape. Her behaviour is morally involuntary, yet the immediacy 
and presence criteria, strictly construed, would preclude her from 
resorting to s. 17.
252
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the defense of duress would apply in 
this situation even though the victim was the aggressor rather than a third 
party,
253
 and that there was no other safe avenue of escape on the 
subjective facts of the case.
254
 
For all of these reasons, the court found that the statutory form of the 
duress would apply, there was no safe avenue of escape, the defense had 
an air of reality, and subsequently upheld the acquittal of the defendant. 
This case has now gone to the Supreme Court of Canada, and arguments 
were heard and decision reserved on June 14, 2012 just before the 
publication of this Article. This is a good opportunity for the court to 
clarify the defense of duress and ameliorate some of the questionable 
elements outstanding from Ruzic. The Crown wishes to retry the case 
arguing that self-defense has been confused with the defense of duress, 
that there was a misapprehension of the evidence, that there was not an air 
of reality to the defense, and that the common law defense would not 
apply to someone who has hired a hitman.
255
 This is a great opportunity to 
discuss all of these duress issues, but it is likely that some of the elements 
from Ruzic will not be considered in this upcoming decision, leaving some 
ambiguity.   
 
 
 252. Id. para. 88. 
 253. Id. para. 99. 
 254. Id. para. 108. These factors included Mr. Ryan‘s history of violence to Ms. Ryan and others, 
his control of Ms. Ryan, his possession of firearms, the specific threats concerning how he would kill 
Ms. Ryan and their daughter, and his lack of response to those in authority. See id. para. 108. 
 255. R. v. Ryan: The Defence of Duress, THE LAWYERS WEEKLY (Can.), June 8, 2012, at 4. 
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III. THE ESSENTIAL ISSUES: WILL, EXCLUDED OFFENSES, THREATS TO 
THIRD PARTIES, THE CANADIAN ―OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE STANDARD,‖ 
AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
There are several elements which are common to both civil and 
criminal duress. For example, the courts in both civil and criminal law 
have referred to the ―will,‖ excluded offenses, threats to third parties, the 
Canadian ―objective-subjective‖ standard, and the burden of proof. These 
issues have been examined with various rates of success by each system. 
By comparing what the courts have done in the two types of duress helps 
to clarify the preferable approach for both. 
A. The ―Will‖ of the Individual 
The truth about both criminal and contractual duress is that the 
literature on this topic is replete with difficult rhetoric. This rhetoric is 
most evident in the ―overborne will‖ element of contractual duress. Duress 
or coercion is said to be ―‗overcoming,‘ ‗overbearing,‘ ‗overpowering,‘ 
‗breaking,‘ ‗destroying,‘ ‗subverting,‘ ‗removing,‘ ‗neutralizing,‘ or 
otherwise through some traumatic inner ordeal, rendering the individual‘s 
will impotent . . . a ‗pressure‘ that ‗compels the will to yield,‘ or on the 
other hand as a ‗suction process‘ that ‗drains it of its capacity for free 
choice.‘‖256 Yet, as Fingarette notes, the language is ―rich, dramatic, and 
correspondingly lacking in objective specificity of meaning.‖257 This was 
certainly true in Blackstone‘s objective requirement that the duress 
overcome the will of a ―person of ordinary firmness.‖258 The standard was 
then transformed to something more subjective, and asked if the victim 
was deprived of his or her ―free will.‖259 The concept of free will was 
discussed in depth in the New York state case of Austin Instrument Inc. v. 
Loral Corp., where the court concluded that a ―contract is voidable on the 
ground of duress when it is established that the party making the claim 
was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat precluding the 
exercise of his free will.‖260 However, courts have also adopted another 
 
 
 256. Fingarette, supra note 7, at 71. 
 257. Id. at 72. 
 258. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 440 n.1 (citing W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 131 (1765)). 
 259. Austin Instrument Inc. v. Loral, 272 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1971). 
 260. Id. at 535. 
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standard that takes into account whether the victim had ―no reasonable 
alternative.‖261 
1. Overborne Will and Contractual Duress 
Modern contractual duress eliminates the common law focus on an 
overborne will and the destruction of will in order to ―negate‖ consent.262 
Instead, this conception of duress still involves coercion, just not to the 
extent of destruction of the will of the person. In fact, Bigwood goes as far 
as to say ―the overborne will theory was nonsensical: the victim who 
hands over his possessions to the highwayman acts ‗intentionally,‘ 
consciously and freely choosing this alternative to the promised 
violence.‖263 Theorist Patrick Atiyah is also incredulous about the concept 
of an overborne will in contractual duress because the theory would 
―divert attention into quite irrelevant inquiries into the psychological 
motivations of the party pleading duress.‖264 Duress can be best 
conceptualized as constraint rather than a psychological condition, and the 
duress doctrine really has little to do with a party‘s ―willingness.‖265 
Wertheimer concludes that ―the moral question is whether [the party under 
duress] is responsible for his action and not whether he is happy about 
it.‖266 When contractual duress is concerned, the concern is whether the 
defendant should have been free from any coercion rather than being 
overborne.
267
 
Furthermore, the court in Attorney-General found that ―vitiating 
consent‖ is no longer the focus in duress cases.268 Instead, the focus is now 
on consent and the ―quality of that consent‖ and whether it was true 
consent.
269
 However, the court also adds the proviso that if consent has 
been given where there is a justification for relief in that ―the party who 
acted under duress may avoid the contract, unless it has been affirmed 
once the circumstances amounting to duress have ceased to operate.‖270 
Although most theorists thought that the criminal case of Lynch
271
 had put 
 
 
 261. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 440. See Leeper v. Beltrami, 347 P.2d 12, 19 (1959). 
 262. Bigwood, Coercion, supra note 160, at 207.  
 263. Id. at 207 n.28. 
 264. Patrick S. Atiyah, Economic Duress and the ‗Overborne Will‘, 98 L.Q.R. 197, 202 (1982). 
 265. Bigwood, Coercion, supra note 160, at 207. 
 266. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2. 
 267. Bigwood, Coercion, supra note 160, at 208. 
 268. Att‘y Gen. for England and Wales v R. [2002] 2 NZLR 91 (CA) para. 60 (N.Z.). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 (H.L.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] CANADIAN CONTRACTUAL AND CRIMINAL DURESS 251 
 
 
 
 
the theory of overborne will to rest, Justice Hammond acknowledged the 
debate in contract in Pharmacy Care saying that the ―victim‘s will must be 
overborne by the improper pressure so that his or her free will and 
judgment have been displaced.‖272 Many say that Justice Hammond did 
not intend to restart the overborne will debate, but rather he merely 
intended to add that the victim ―succumbed to pressure.‖273 The term is not 
a danger to the discussion but ―can be safely left, like other chameleon 
phrases, to take its colour from its context.‖274 The rhetoric around 
contractual duress has been freed from the fruitless debates of the actor 
and his will which is a lesson the criminal law has not learned. 
2. Overborne Will and Criminal Law 
As discussed above, the discussion of an overborne will has led to the 
confounding of the concepts of moral blameworthiness and moral 
involuntariness in the criminal law. Section 17 of the Criminal Code was 
found to violate the principles of fundamental justice because it is wrong 
to convict someone who behaves in a ―morally involuntary‖ way.275 
Debates about the individual and will, from a moral and voluntariness 
standard, flourish in the criminal system.  
Some have noted that the definition of moral involuntariness used in 
Ruzic is quite broad and ―[o]n its face, it captures a whole range of human 
conduct, most of which would not ordinarily be classified as conduct 
performed under duress.‖276 Theorist Martha Shaffer suggests that the 
threatened person lacks the autonomy to have real choice. Shaffer claims: 
An accused who acts to avoid threatened harm is morally 
blameworthy of the harm that she causes because she intended to 
bring about that harm (assuming that moral blameworthiness is 
limited to considerations of mens rea). Nonetheless, she is not 
criminally responsible for her actions because the basic precept of 
criminal responsibility—that the accused was a freely choosing 
actor—is not made out. A person whose actions were morally 
involuntary does not by definition enjoy the autonomy that the law 
demands for an attribution of criminal responsibility. Consequently, 
 
 
 272. Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd. v Att‘y Gen. [2004] CA 198/03 para. 98 (N.Z.). 
 273. TINA YEE, THE ETHRIDGE INFLUENCE ON UNDUE INFLUENCE 97 (2008) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Coughlan, supra note 222.  
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such a person cannot be held criminally responsible for the harm 
that she causes.
277
  
Shaffer believes that the presence and immediacy requirements are 
―inadequate proxies‖ for ascertaining moral involuntariness.278 Elevating 
moral involuntariness to the level of a principle of fundamental justice has 
very serious ramifications which might not yet be fully appreciated.
279
 
Unlike Shaffer, Justice LeBel in Ruzic found that the concepts of moral 
involuntariness and moral blameworthiness had to be separate and distinct 
because ―morally involuntary conduct is not always inherently blameless. 
Once the elements of the offense have been established, the accused can 
no longer be considered blameless.‖280 He went on to say that the 
―indefinable and potentially far-reaching nature of the concept of moral 
blamelessness prevents us from recognizing its relevance beyond an initial 
finding of guilt in the context of Section 7 of the Charter. Holding 
otherwise would inject an unacceptable degree of uncertainty into the 
law.‖281 For example, if a lost alpinist forces entry (a criminal act) into a 
cabin in order to save his own life it is difficult to see the alpinist as 
completely blameless, but the state does not punish ―because the 
circumstances did not leave him with any other realistic choice than to 
commit the offense.‖282 What would function better is that the excuse 
should focus not on the act but on the circumstances and the ability of the 
individual to avoid the results.
283
 Thus, instead of eliminating this debate 
as has been done in contract law, the overborne will is alive and well in 
the criminal law. This confusion between moral involuntariness, moral 
blame, fundamental justice and the overborne will adds very little to the 
discussion. 
Again the concept of ―realistic choice‖ surfaces but many scholars 
argue that this concept is value-laden and greatly undermines using moral 
involuntariness as a principle of fundamental justice.
284
 As the actor was 
left with no realistic choice, there was not much doubt that the ―presence‖ 
and ―immediacy‖ portions of Section 17 would eventually be found to 
 
 
 277. Martha Shaffer, Scrutinizing Duress: The Constitutional Validity of S. 17 of the Criminal 
Code, 40 CRIM. L.Q. 444, 460–61 (1998) [hereinafter Shaffer, Scrutinizing Duress]. 
 278. Id. at 466.  
 279. For a full discussion of the principles of fundamental justice and its history, see PETER W. 
HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 44.10(a) (2005).  
 280. Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 41. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. para. 40. 
 283. R. v. Ruzic [1998], 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 40 (Can.). 
 284. See Yeo, supra note 19, 335; Coughlan, supra note 222, at 196. 
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violate Section 7 of the Charter. The real issue was ―why they violate 
section 7.‖285 The court found that to convict one acting in a morally 
involuntary manner is ―a violation of the principles of fundamental justice. 
In other words, they gave the concept of moral involuntariness the same 
status as moral blameworthiness, rather than having the former rely on the 
latter. On this basis, the presence and immediacy requirements could be 
struck down directly.‖286 Philosopher George Fletcher‘s comments on the 
overborne will were widely cited by the Supreme Court in Ruzic:  
excuses absolve the accused of personal accountability by focussing 
[sic], not on the wrongful act, but on the circumstances of the act 
and the accused‘s personal capacity to avoid it. Necessity and 
duress are characterized as concessions to human frailty in this 
sense. The law is designed for the common man, not for a 
community of saints or heroes.
287
  
Although Lynch
288
 purported to settle this discussion not only in the 
criminal law but in contracts as well, this term continued to cloud the 
discussion throughout the development of duress. Pao On, decided after 
Lynch, again said that ―[d]uress, whatever form it takes, is a coercion of 
the will so as to vitiate consent.‖289 Atiyah notes that this analysis ―is 
totally inconsistent with the speeches in the House of Lords in the Lynch 
case.‖290 In that case, all five justices rejected the concept of overborne 
will.
291
 The real encapsulation of duress from both a civil and a criminal 
standpoint can be found in the Latin term coactus volui, or ―[h]aving been 
forced I was willing.‖292 Lord Wilberforce in Lynch made the connection 
to this term, differentiating between the civil and criminal law. He noted 
that there is a good analogy between contracts and criminal law because in 
a civil example ―duress does not destroy the will, for example, to enter 
into a contract, but prevents the law from accepting what has happened as 
 
 
 285. Coughlan, supra note 222, at 186. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 40. 
 288. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 (H.L.) [670].  
 289. Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long [1980] A.C. 614 [635] (P.C.) (Eng.). 
 290. Atiyah, supra note 264, at 199. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See R.J. Schork, Joyce and Justinian: U 250 and 520, 23 JAMES JOYCE QUARTERLY 77 
(1985), who has translated this material and notes that this phrase came from Justinian‘s Digest 
IV.2.21.5 in a sixth century discussion of ―force and fear on the validity of a ‗contractual‘ action.‖ The 
full discussion means ―si metu coactus adii hereditatem, puto me heredem effici, quia quamuis si 
liberum esset noluissem, tamen coactus volui.‖ (If I have been forced by fear to accept a legacy, I 
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a contract valid in law . . . .‖293 The criminal defense is a strange hybrid; 
the subject has to admit that he has done the act, but they should not be 
responsible.
294
 However, others note that, in fact, those instances of ―more 
extreme pressure were precisely those in which the consent expressed was 
more real; the more unpleasant the alternative, the more real the consent to 
a course which would avoid it.‖295 Atiyah cites the example of the ―victim 
of the modern mugger who surrenders his wallet with a knife at his throat 
certainly knows what he is doing, and intends to do it.‖296 Atiyah 
concludes that ―overborne will‖ is really not a factor in either contractual 
or criminal cases, given the statements in Lynch which are fundamental to 
duress and not simply confined to one system or the other.
297
 Furthermore, 
Atiyah asserts that the overborne will theory is ―internally inconsistent and 
contradictory‖ and should be ―consigned to the historical scrapheap.‖298 
Based on these assertions, it is reasonable to conclude that perhaps all 
discussions of ―will‖ in contracts and criminal law should be eliminated. 
Although matters are more emotional in the criminal realm, a page should 
be taken from the contractual approach. 
B. Excluded Offenses—Criminal and Contractual 
In regards to contractual duress in the civil law, it has become quite 
clear that the court is willing to extend the concept to family law, estates, 
business relationships, property disputes, and a host of other situations. 
Unlike criminal duress, there has never been any consideration that the 
duress is barred as an unavailable defense against certain civil offenses. 
The explanation for this completely divergent approach is scarcely 
mentioned in the case law or in scholarly comment. 
It is imperative that the court reconsider the excluded offenses for 
criminal duress: the choice of excluded crimes does not make practical 
sense because of the random selection of the list. There is a long history in 
Canada of recognizing the criminal defense of duress, despite its 
inadequacies and the fact that it was seen as ―too pregnant with potential 
 
 
 293. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 (H.L.) [680]. 
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Intangible Captivity: The Potential For a New Canadian Criminal Defence Of Brainwashing and Its 
Implications for the Battered Woman (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author). 
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danger to permit of its recognition.‖299 Yet which offenses, if any, should 
be excluded continues to be controversial. Fletcher argues very directly 
that ―[i]f duress in fact functions as an excuse, there should be no 
impediment to invoking the excuse to any wrongful act, including 
homicide.‖300 There is also serious question today whether any excluded 
offense can withstand Charter scrutiny.
301
 Most importantly, Shaffer notes 
that ―any attempt to put an offense, even one as serious as murder, 
completely outside of the scope of duress cannot be sustained under the 
Charter.‖302 
Thus, even if the excluded offenses are constitutionally challenged and 
removed from what is left of Section 17, it may still be necessary to retain 
some excluded offenses. As Justice Laskin noted in the Court of Appeal 
decision in Ruzic, that it may be the case that these restrictions, including 
the excluded offenses, are selected in such an arbitrary way that they are 
unfair and violate Section 7 of the Charter.
303
 In the future, this argument 
might be very effective to explain why some offenses should have been 
excluded while more serious ones were not. The court in Fraser found that 
robbery was no longer an excluded offense.
304
 The decision is brief stating 
that: 
counsel for both the crown and defense have concur [sic] and this 
court concludes that § 17 of the Criminal Code in so far as it 
eliminates the defense of duress and/or necessity in offenses 
concerning robbery is of no force and effect as being contrary to the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in particular § 7 of 
the Charter.
305
  
With this evidence, there seemed to be general agreement that robbery 
should not be an excluded offense.  
 
 
 299. George H. Crouse, A Critique of Canadian Criminal Legislation, 9 CAN. BAR REV. 545, 569 
(1934). 
 300. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 831 (1978). Surprisingly, Fletcher notes 
that mass murder should be excluded as ―the cost in human lives is sufficiently high we could properly 
expect someone to resist threats to his own life,‖ just pages after he said that duress should not exclude 
any offenses. Id. at 833. 
 301. Shaffer, Scrutinizing Duress, supra note 277, at 473.  
 302. Id. at 473. Interestingly, Shaffer notes that ―[i]f the accused‘s actions are truly morally 
involuntary, removing the defence of duress will not accomplish the goal of protecting third persons 
since the accused would have committed the action anyways.‖ Id. 
 303. R. v. Ruzic (1998), 41 O.R. 3d 1, para. 50.  
 304. R. v. Fraser, 3 C.R. (6th) 308 O.R. [2002] N.S.J. No. 401 (N.S.P.C.). 
 305. Id. para. 5. 
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Today‘s case law certainly questions the soundness of the included and 
excluded offenses, especially with respect to more serious cases like 
murder. For all of the reasons discussed in Part I the exclusion of these 
crimes seems to have been created wholly by Stephen‘s personal beliefs. 
There is no evidence that the bulk of the offenses were added for any 
particular reason. When one examines the excluded offenses more 
carefully today, certain absurdities become apparent. It has been noted 
that, even though offenses of murder would be excluded from the defense,  
[t]here is nothing, however to prevent a duress argument in cases of 
manslaughter or infanticide. The latter seems an unlikely 
possibility, although if a new mother did kill her baby under duress 
while the balance of her mind was disturbed, the prosecutorial 
decision to lay an infanticide, rather than a murder, charge would at 
least leave the possibility of a complete acquittal open.
306
  
This impractical and unprincipled use of excluded offenses does not add to 
the modern discussion of duress. To examine this issue, one needs only to 
look at murder as a representative offense to examine how excluded 
offenses will fit into the new common law defense of duress. 
Scholars have said that the ―modern debate between the ‗legal 
pragmatists‘ and the ‗ethicists‘ on the question of murder, is an historical 
anomaly.‖307 If the defense of duress is available for other crimes, the  
critical question here is whether heavily constrained choice should 
ever be accepted as an excuse for serious crime . . . [t]he issue is not 
whether the defendant has done the right thing in the circumstances 
. . . but whether we should be prepared to exculpate him for doing 
the wrong thing—because his freedom of choice was so heavily 
constrained by serious threats that . . . his ‗choice‘ is no true choice 
at all [but] remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts.
308
  
By allowing duress as a defense to murder, the system is not saying that it 
is praiseworthy to commit this crime, any more than it is to commit a non-
excluded offense. It is illogical to exclude the defense of duress in the case 
of murder. To do so placates the antiquated views of a handful of 
historical theorists.  
 
 
 306. ISABEL GRANT, DOROTHY CHUNN & CHRISTINE BOYLE, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 6–64 
(1999).  
 307. BROOKBANKS, OVERVIEW, supra note 71, at 13. 
 308. McAuley, supra note 76, at 173. 
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Interestingly, Lord Wilberforce stated in Lynch that ―if the proposition 
is correct at all that duress prevents what would otherwise constitute a 
crime from attracting criminal responsibility, then that should be correct 
whatever the crime.‖309 Later, in reference to the excluded offenses that 
were added by Stephen without explanation, Lord Wilberforce noted that 
the excluded offenses were ―not adopted in England,‖ and they ―did not 
represent the law at the time and certainly [do] not now represent the law 
as it is.‖310 What the court needed to say was that the offender acted under 
an unfairly limited choice and that the offender‘s actions were 
understandable. 
The courts in each of the Commonwealth countries should be urged to 
remove excluded offenses from their provisions on duress. Clearly, fear by 
legislators of the consequences of expanding the duress defense to all 
crimes has existed since the inception of the defense. Judges have been 
quick to point out that ―[w]e are not living in a dream world in which the 
mounting wave of violence and terrorism can be contained by strict logic 
and intellectual niceties alone. Common sense surely reveals the added 
dangers to which in this modern world the public would be exposed.‖311 
Thus, at its fundamental basis, fear keeps the courts from fully accepting 
this sometimes tenuous defense and causes the artificial restraints on its 
use. Canada has the most number of excluded offenses of virtually any 
common law country including New Zealand,
312
 England,
313
 Australia,
314
 
 
 
 309. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 (H.L.) [680–84]. 
 310. Id. at 684. 
 311. Abbott v. The Queen, [1977] A.C. 755, 766 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago). 
 312. New Zealand‘s law on duress also followed from the provisions of the Draft Code. See 
Gerald Orchard, The Defence of Compulsion, 9 N.Z.U. L. Rev. 105, 105 (1980). New Zealand‘s 
provisions on compulsion have been far more restrictive than the Australian duress provisions and are 
more like Section 17 of the Canadian Criminal Code. As a result, their provision on duress is also 
extremely restrictive. Section 24 of New Zealand‘s Crimes Act 1961, Public Act 1961 No 43, excludes 
13 offenses and provides that: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person who commits an offence under 
compulsion by threats of immediate death or grievous bodily harm from a person who is 
present when the offence is committed is protected from criminal responsibility if he believes 
that the threats will be carried out and if he is not a party to any association or conspiracy 
whereby he is subject to compulsion. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall apply where the offence committed is an offence 
specified in any of the following provisions of this Act, namely: 
 (a) section 73 (treason) or section 78 (communicating secrets): 
 (b) section 79 (sabotage): 
 (c) section 92 (piracy): 
 (d) section 93 (piratical acts): 
 (e) sections 167 and 168 (murder): 
 (f) section 173 (attempt to murder): 
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 (g) section 188 (wounding with intent): 
 (h) subsection (1) of section 189 (injuring with intent to cause 
  grievous bodily harm): 
 (i) section 208 (abduction): 
 (j) section 209 (kidnapping): 
 (k) section 234 (robbery): 
 (ka) Repealed  
 (l) section 235 (aggravated robbery): 
 (m) section 267 (arson). 
(3) Where a woman who is married or in a civil union commits an offence, the fact that her 
husband or civil union partner was present at the commission of the offence does not of itself 
raise a presumption of compulsion. 
 313. England is in a more intermediary position, in terms of the restrictiveness of the defense. R. 
v. Hasan, [2005] H.L.J. No. 8, [2005] UKHL 22 (H.L.) is the highest court pronouncement on the 
defense of duress in England, and it sets down most of the elements that are being employed in 
England today with respect to duress. The House of Lords restored the conviction from the trial courts. 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill noted generally, it is ―unsurprising that the law in this and other 
jurisdictions should have been developed so as to confine the defence of duress within narrowly 
defined limits.‖ Id. para. 21. However, on excluded offenses the court recognized that only three 
general offenses as they noted that:  
(1) Duress does not afford a defence to charges of murder (R v Howe [1987] AC 417), 
attempted murder (R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412) and, perhaps, some forms of treason (Smith & 
Hogan, Criminal Law, 10th ed., 2002, p 254). The Law Commission has in the past (e.g. [sic] 
in ―Criminal Law. Report on Defences of General Application‖ (Law Com No 83, Cm 556, 
1977, paras 2.44-2.46, [1977] EWLC 83 )) recommended that the defence should be available 
as a defence to all offences, including murder, and the logic of this argument is irresistible. 
But their recommendation has not been adopted, no doubt because it is felt that in the case of 
the gravest crimes no threat to the defendant, however extreme, should excuse commission of 
the crime. 
Id. 
 314. Australian Capital Territory and the Criminal Code Act of the Northern Territory of 
Australian provides in Sections 40 and 41 that:  
(1) The excuse referred to in subsection (1) does not extend to an act, omission or event that 
would constitute a crime of which serious harm or an intention to cause such harm is an 
element; nor to a person who has rendered himself liable to have such a threat made to him by 
having entered into an association or conspiracy that has as any of its objects the doing of a 
wrongful act. 
Thus, only those crimes that involve a conspiracy or association are excluded. 
 Some provisions are very close to the Canadian system, see, for example, the Criminal Code Act 
1924, (No. 69 of 1924) now in effect in Tasmania, which provides that: 
20 (1) Except as provided by section 64, compulsion by threats of immediate death or 
grievous bodily harm, from a person actually present at the commission of the offence, shall 
be an excuse for the commission, by a person subject to such threats, and who believes that 
such threats will be executed, and who is not a party to any association or conspiracy the 
being a party to which rendered him subject to compulsion, of any offence other than treason, 
murder, piracy, offences deemed to be piracy, attempting to murder, rape, forcible abduction, 
aggravated armed robbery, armed robbery, aggravated robbery, robbery, causing grievous 
bodily harm, and arson. 
 In Queensland, in the present Criminal Code Act 1899, No. 5C, the provision is quite different 
than the other states and territories; in that it provides in Section 31 that: 
(2) However, this protection does not extend to an act or omission which would constitute the 
crime of murder, or an offence of which grievous bodily harm to the person of another, or an 
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and the United States.
315
 If duress is a concession to human frailty which 
centers on moral involuntariness, then why should any offense be 
excluded?
316
 The fundamental question of why any offense should be 
excluded should be re-examined. 
C. Threat
317
 
Another issue in duress is the element of ―threat.‖ The court has paid a 
considerable amount of attention to this element, and who this threat is 
directed towards.   
 
 
intention to cause such harm, is an element, nor to a person who has by entering into an 
unlawful association or conspiracy rendered himself or herself liable to have such threats 
made to the person. 
 315. It is difficult to generalize about the state of duress in the United States as various states have 
adopted differing ways to deal with the defense. Generally, the United States is similar to Australia in 
its inclusiveness. The Model Penal Code (―MPC‖) provides in section 2.09 (2) that:  
(2) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself 
in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is 
also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever 
negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. 
 316. Shaffer suggests that if there were no excluded offenses, just an element of proportionality 
would be required to make sure that the actions matched the harm being avoided. See Martha Shaffer, 
Coerced into Crime: Battered Women and the Defence of Duress, 4 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 271, 322–27 
(1999) [hereinafter Shaffer, Coerced]; see also Gary T. Trotter, Necessity and Death: Lessons from 
Latimer and the Case of the Conjoined Twins, 40 ALBERTA L. REV. 817 (2003). 
 317. A note must be made that much of the discussion of contractual duress, and in particular 
economic duress, is the concern over what constitutes an ―illegitimate threat.‖ Though beyond the 
scope of this paper regarding contractual duress generally, it is important to note that in Universe 
Tankships, the ultimate result was that the pressure was legitimate and did not constitute duress. 
Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. Int‘l Transp. Workers‘ Fed‘n, [1983] 1 A.C. 366, 405–06 (H.L.) 
(Eng.). The debate on the line between legitimate and illegitimate in a business context lead to the 
result in Attorney-General, that the elements of pressure and illegitimacy are linked as ―[i]llegitimate 
pressure may amount to duress even if there is a practical choice, but the absence of practical choice 
may suggest the pressure is illegitimate.‖ Att‘y Gen. for England and Wales v R. [2002] 2 NZLR 91 
(CA) para. 60 (N.Z.). The court went on to say, that in ―all duress cases the Court must consider 
whether the pressure under which the plaintiff was acting should be regarded as legitimate or 
illegitimate and, in that respect, the nature of any alternatives reasonably open to the plaintiff will be of 
major importance.‖ Id. para. 62; see also Gordon v. Roebuck (1992), 92 D.L.R. 4th 670 (Ont. C.A.) 
(Can.) (adopting the test of Lord Scarman for economic duress and breaking the requirements into four 
factors). The Court named the four factors: ―(1) Did he protest? (2) Was there an alternative course 
open to him? (3) Was he independently advised? (4) After entering the contract did he take steps to 
avoid it?‖ Id. Boyle and Percy have noted that trying to distinguish between ―justified and unjustified 
economic duress rather than between economic pressure and economic duress‖ would be the 
preferable method of dealing with this question. BOYLE & PERCY, supra note 3, at 716. 
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1. Threats to Third Parties in Contract Law 
It is clear that actual violence perpetrated in the name of a contract has 
been found to apply to threats to the other party‘s family as well as threats 
to oneself.
318
 One of the earliest cases involving an illegitimate threat to a 
third party was the 1904 English Appeal case of Kaufman v. Gerson.
319
 In 
this case the defendant, Mrs. Gerson, gave evidence that she was induced 
into an agreement with Kaufman in order to prevent Kaufman from 
bringing a criminal proceeding against Mr. Gerson. She agreed to repay a 
large sum of money over a period of years to preserve the ―good name of 
Gerson‘s children, [and] his wife.‖320 Even though the subject of the threat 
was not a party to the contract, the court found that indeed this was duress, 
regardless of its non-physical nature, because ―[s]ome persons would be 
more easily coerced by moral pressure, such as was exercised here, than 
by the threat of physical violence.‖321 Justice Collins found that it ―seems 
to me to be impossible to say that it is not coercion to threaten a wife with 
the dishonour of her husband and children.‖322 The court dismissed 
Kaufman‘s action for payment finding that the court ―will not enforce a 
contract which has been obtained by means of such moral coercion as was 
here used . . . we ought to refuse to enforce a contract which ought never 
to have been made.‖323 Thus, a threat to a third party outside of the 
contract was found to be duress even though the target was unaware of the 
threat of harm. 
In the 1976 British Columbia Supreme Court case Saxon v. Saxon, Mrs. 
Saxon sought to set aside her conveyance of a half interest in the 
matrimonial home, and to set aside the execution of the separation 
agreement.
324
 The plaintiff alleged duress, saying that her husband had 
threatened to murder the couple‘s two children, ages six and five, to 
induce the separation agreement.
325
 The court weighed the evidence: the 
reliability of the testimony of both parties; the ―gross dissimilarities‖ in 
signature of the plaintiff compared to that on the separation agreement; 
and previous acts of violence toward the plaintiff and others.
326
 Justice 
 
 
 318. MCCAMUS, supra note 156, at 369. 
 319. Kaufman v. Gerson, [1904] 1 K.B. 591 (Eng.). 
 320. Id. at 595. 
 321. Id. at 597. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 599. 
 324. Saxon v. Saxon, [1976] 4 W.W.R. 300-01, aff‘d in [1978] 4 W.W.R. 327 (B.C.C.A.) (Can.).  
 325. Saxon, 4 W.W.R. at 301.  
 326. Id. at 301, 307. 
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Spencer found that the defendant ―did much as he wanted, committed 
adultery, pressured the plaintiff to fly to England knowing that she feared 
to do so, badgered and harassed her with meanness and with belittling 
remarks in public‖ and that she was ―cowed by her husband.‖327 The 
plaintiff was hit and kicked by the defendant who also threatened her with 
a knife.
328
 The court found that the defendant did make threats ―against the 
plaintiff and the children that he would kill them if she did not sign the 
agreement . . . two weeks after he had threatened her with a knife and hit 
and kicked her.‖329 The court concluded that the plaintiff was ―oppressed 
and confused‖ and dominated after several years of marriage, and that she 
was deeply affected by the breakdown of the marriage and her husband‘s 
suicide attempt.
330
 The court found that all of these factors amounted to 
duress as she was not allowed to seek advice and was oppressed by the 
defendant. Given this and the threats to the third-party children, the court 
found the agreement and deed void ab initio.
331
 
Threats to third parties were extended even further in the bitter family 
battle in the more recent 1990 British Columbia appeals case, Byle v. 
Byle.
332
 In this case, a business agreement was reached amongst family 
members, including the mother, father, and several of their children.
333
 
The purpose of this agreement was to resolve outstanding disputes 
between two of their sons.
334
 The first brother, JB, said that he would harm 
his brother, BB, unless this agreement was signed by their parents.
335
 The 
parents subsequently argued that the agreement was unenforceable as they 
had entered into the contract for fear that JB would ―blow [BB‘s] head 
off.‖336 The trial court found that Mr. and Mrs. Byle only agreed to 
execute the agreement because ―they feared that [JB] might carry out a 
threat of harm to [BB].‖337 The trial judge, Justice Legg, noted that Mrs. 
Byle was medically unstable and was suffering from bone cancer at the 
time of this agreement.
338
 The meeting leading to the agreement was 
 
 
 327. Id. at 309. 
 328. Id. at 310. 
 329. Id.  
 330. Id.  
 331. Saxon v. Saxon, [1976] 4 W.W.R. 300, 311. 
 332. Byle v. Byle, [1990] 65 D.L.R. 4th 641 (Can. B.C.C.A.).  
 333. Id. at 642.  
 334. Id. at 645.  
 335. Id. at 646.  
 336. Id.  
 337. Id. at 647. 
 338. Byle v. Byle, [1990] 65 D.L.R. 4th 641, 646 (Can. B.C.C.A.). 
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several hours long, and Mrs. Byle was in severe pain.
339
 The trial court 
found that  
both Mr. and Mrs. Byle were prepared to do almost anything to 
prevent the tragedy of an attack by [JB] upon [BB] . . . There was 
no opportunity for Mr. and Mrs. Byle to consider the text of the 
whole agreement . . . [and BB testified that] his father did not 
understand some of the provisions in the agreement which he had 
signed.
340
 
One of the key arguments in the case was that JB made the statements 
to a third party who communicated them to Mr. and Mrs. Byle. JB argued 
that the ―threat‖ was not duress because ―it involved no intention of 
causing Mr. and Mrs. Byle to do anything.‖341 As affirmed by the Court of 
Appeal, the trial court found:  
[I]t is sufficient to render the agreement void if a threat of harm is 
acted upon by the party against whom the agreement is sought to be 
enforced. That party himself need not be the party who is threatened 
with harm.
342
  
The trial judge went on to say that although the couple had obtained 
legal advice, they were nonetheless frightened that these acts of violence 
would be carried out and that this amounted to ―coercion of their will so as 
to vitiate their consent.‖343 Thus, threats to third parties may vitiate 
consent of the actors and courts may find the contract signed under such 
threats unenforceable.  
Case law over the last 100 years has shown that there must be a certain 
relationship between the individual threatened and the party to the 
contract. Qualifying relationships include a ―family relative, a friend, or 
some person for whom the contracting party is responsible, such as an 
employee or principal.‖344 The employer-employee relationship in this 
context was found to be the subject of duress in the 1999 British case of 
Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V. v. Mountain.
345
 This case involved five 
Dutch companies who were dredging at a port in Iraq near the Kuwait 
 
 
 339. Id. at 647. 
 340. Id.  
 341. Id. at 649. 
 342. Id.  
 343. Id. at 650.  
 344. ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 58–59. 
 345. Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V. v. Mountain, [1999] Q.B. 674 (Can. C.A.). 
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border when the Gulf War began in 1990.
346
 The plaintiffs alleged 
substantial duress in finalizing an agreement to abandon claims under the 
dredging contract with the Iraqi government. The tenor of the negotiations 
was punctuated by the reality that the Iraqis refused to evacuate the 
company personnel near the Kuwait border until the contract was 
signed.
347
 Justice Phillips gave the judgment of the court and concluded 
that there ―remains a class of duress so unconscionable that it will cause 
the English court, as a matter of public policy, to override the proper law 
of the contract.‖348 In respect to the case at hand, Justice Phillips noted 
firmly that the ―threat to use a large number of personnel as human shields 
was about as cogent and unconscionable a form of duress as one can 
imagine.‖349 It is clear that the courts will intervene in the context of an 
employee and employer. The law‘s response to a threat to a complete 
stranger, however, has yet to be considered, but given the findings in 
Royal Boskalis, it may be a possibility.
350
 
2. Threats to Third Parties in Criminal Law 
Despite initial hesitation, threats to third parties are still relevant to 
judges‘ decisions about the availability of the codified version of duress. 
Ruzic answered some of the questions about the application of the 
Criminal Code section,
351
 but how threats to third parties impact the 
application of duress is still indecipherable to many commentators.
352
 In 
Lynch, Lord Simon of Glaisdale questioned the defense of third parties
 
 
 346. Id. at 674–75.  
 347. Id. at 678–79. 
 348. Id. (quoting DICEY & MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (12th ed. 1993) ―[N]o doubt there 
may be acts of coercion or duress (or fraud) which are so shocking that the court will not enforce the 
contract irrespective of whether it is valid under its governing law.‖); DICEY & MORRIS, at 1279.  
 349. Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V. v. Mountain, [1999] Q.B. 730 (Can. C.A.). 
 350. ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 59. But Enonchong does see that a threat to a stranger might 
constitute duress under the right circumstances. He notes that  
[I]t would be unwise to rule out completely the possibility that in certain rare circumstances 
the complainant may be induced to enter into a contract by a threat to a third party. Suppose 
B, an escaping criminal, grabs a child from her mother in the street, puts a gun to the child‘s 
head and threatens to shoot her unless A, a passerby, pays him a sum of money. If A pays the 
money the court is unlikely to refuse his claim to recover it from B as money paid under 
duress. The threat to the child and the demand from B puts A under a degree of moral 
pressure which is easy to recognize.  
Id.  
 351. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 103 (Can.).  
 352. See, for example, Shaffer, Coerced, supra note 316, at 318 in the context of battered women.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
264 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:215 
 
 
 
 
within duress from a criminal and contractual perspective.
353
 He noted that 
although contractual duress is fairly broad, there is no clear answer in the 
criminal law and whether the ―threat must be of harm to the person 
required to perform the act, or extends to the immediate family of the actor 
(and how immediate?), or to any person.‖354 Lord Simon asked,  
[I]s it worse to have a pistol thrust into your back and a grenade into 
your hand, or to have your child (or a neighbour‘s child) seized by 
terrorists and held at peril until you have placed in a public building 
a parcel which you believe to contain a bomb?
355
  
In short, courts still examine the nature of the threat and to whom the 
threat is directed. Although threats to third parties are clearly within the 
scope of criminal duress at common law, it is likely that the defense will 
be available only if death or serious bodily harm results. The accused 
should still be expected to show some fortitude and assert some resistance 
to the threat. Justice LeBel also noted in Ruzic that ―[n]either the words of 
s. 17 nor the Court's reasons in Carker and Paquette dictate that the target 
of the threatened harm must be the accused. They simply require that the 
threat must be made to the accused. Section 17 may thus include threats 
against third parties.‖356 Again, these factors will have to be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis, but threats to third parties will continue to be an issue 
relevant to the availability of duress in the criminal law. Again, the 
criminal law could use the example of the civil system recognize other 
targets.
357
 
D. Canada‘s ―Objective-Subjective‖ Standard 
1. Canada‘s ―Objective-Subjective‖ Standard in Contractual Duress 
There are divergent opinions regarding how much pressure the plaintiff 
should withstand when measuring whether one was under contractual 
duress. The case law has been somewhat vague on what internal factors of 
the accused can be considered. One of the early duress cases, Parmentier 
v. Pater, noted that  
 
 
 353. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653, [1975] 1 All E.R. 913 (H.L.) at 670. 
 354. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. at 686.  
 355. Id.  
 356. R. v. Ruzic [1998], 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 54 (Can.). 
 357. As discussed above, the Supreme Court will have an opportunity in R. v. Ryan (2011), 301 
NSR 2d 255, to clarify the application further, including a threat to a child of the marriage and using a 
third party to kill an abuser. 
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[p]ersons of a ‗weak or cowardly nature‘ are the very ones that need 
protection. The courageous can usually protect themselves. 
Capricious and timid persons are generally the ones that are 
influenced by threats, and it would be a great injustice to permit 
them to be robbed by the unscrupulous because they are so 
unfortunately constituted.
358
  
Subsequent cases like Rubenstein v. Rubenstein have argued that ―age, 
sex, capacity, relation of the parties and all the attendant circumstances 
must be considered.‖359  
Similarly, Allan Farnsworth notes that finding a reasonable alternative, 
the standard of many of the modern cases, ―depends on all the 
circumstances, including the victim‘s age and background, the relationship 
of the parties, and the availability of disinterested advice.‖360  
Theorist Nelson Enonchong has argued that the subjective facts of the 
situation must be taken into account because the threat of further 
proceedings ―may not put an experienced businessman under pressure, it 
may be a huge pressure when directed at an old lady or a person who is 
desperate to avoid the publicity that is likely to be generated by the 
proceedings.‖361 Enonchong argues that what is important in duress is that 
the ―will of the victim is not destroyed; it is directed or deflected. The 
victim who signs a contract under pressure amounting to duress intends to 
sign the contact as the lesser of two evils and is usually aware of the terms 
of the contract.‖362 Again, this goes back to the concept that there is no 
other reasonable choice available. 
The objective-standard is a historic relic in contractual duress that 
contrasts with the objective elements which still exist within the criminal 
law of duress. The thought that the law ―required everyone to possess a 
certain minimum degree of firmness and certain types of illegitimate 
pressure were deemed to be insufficient to deflect the will of a person who 
possessed the ordinary degree of firmness‖ is an antiquated notion.363 This 
notion precludes non-physical types of duress, which has been disproved 
in most modern case law.
364
 This original standard did not protect those 
without ―ordinary firmness‖ or other vulnerable members of society. This 
 
 
 358. Parmentier v. Pater, 13 Ore. 121, 130 (1885); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 442. 
 359. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 14 (NJ).  
 360. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 442. 
 361. ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 36. 
 362. Id. at 37. 
 363. Id. at 46. 
 364. Id. 
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result has lead commentators, viewing the situation from a contractual 
perspective, to say that a ―law of duress which fails to protect the 
vulnerable is bound to be unsatisfactory.‖365 This statement is truly ironic 
given the state of the criminal law where these objective elements still 
exist. At least one purpose of criminal law is to protect victims who are 
arguably vulnerable to those more powerful, but we make the standard 
more difficult in the criminal law with objective elements. Conversely, the 
modern subjective test in contract law looks at whether the pressure on the 
individual complainant was illegitimate.  
The importance of the subjective nature of the contractual defense of 
duress was discussed in the 1956 New Jersey Supreme Court case of 
Rubenstein v. Rubenstein.
366
 This case involved several properties which 
were conveyed to the defendant wife under duress in return for the care of 
two minor children. The husband gave the property interests to the wife 
while under ―fear of his safety and under duress.‖367 The wife‘s father had 
been convicted of poisoning several people as a part of an ―arsenic ring‖ to 
defraud life insurers, for which he was incarcerated at the time of the 
Rubenstein trial.
368
 The husband claimed to be similarly threatened with 
arsenic if he did not convey the properties, that he was told that she would 
―prosecute [him] to the hilt,‖ and that she had told her husband that she 
would be ―better off if [he] were dead.‖369 The plaintiff husband also gave 
accounts of what he called ―gangster violence‖ that was used against him. 
The husband was arrested for desertion of his wife and non-support.
370
 
Justice Heher concluded that the ―controlling factor‖ in the basic 
premise of duress is the ―condition at the time of the mind of the person 
subjected to the coercive measures, rather than the means by which the 
given state of mind was induced, and thus the test is essentially 
subjective.‖371 Justice Heher cited the 1912 case of Fountain v. Bigham for 
the proposition that it is the way the mind is induced so that there is no 
choice. The threat ―must be of such a nature and made under such 
circumstances as to constitute a reasonable and adequate cause to control 
the will of the threatened person and must have that effect; and the act 
 
 
 365. Id. 
 366. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 14 (NJ). 
 367. Id. at 12. 
 368. Id. at 16. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 14. 
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sought to be avoided must be performed by such person while in such 
condition.‖372 
The above principle was clarified by the court in that the important 
element is not the nature of the threatened action or words, but rather the 
―state of mind induced thereby in the victim.‖373 Thus, a very subjective 
test emerged for contractual duress. It has been established that the 
―doctrine of duress has expanded well beyond its early confines, and that a 
threat may be improper even though the person making it has a legal right 
to do the threatened act.‖374 This subjective test continued to broaden. 
The subjective test has been developed through the subsequent 
common law. In the case of Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long, Lord Scarman set 
out principles to be considered in assessing a contractual duress case.
375
 It 
was found that the following factors can be considered when determining 
if there was coercion or an otherwise voluntary act: (1) whether the 
defendant protested; (2) whether the defendant had alternative options, 
including any available legal remedies; (3) whether the defendant was 
―independently advised‖; and (4) whether the defendant took steps to 
avoid the contract after formation.
376
  
These factors permit fact-finders to use a defendant‘s manifestations 
that can be objectively determined to ascertain her subjective mens rea, 
that being whether the pressure induced on that particular individual—not 
the reasonable person—constituted duress on the defendant to complete 
the contract.
377
 This test was affirmed in Pharmacy Care noting that the 
―modern view is that the question is no longer anchored to what was 
threatened, but whether the effect of whatever was threatened was to bring 
about a ‗coercion of the will, which vitiates consent.‘‖378 Justice 
Hammond discussed in Pharmacy Care that there is a ―hybrid 
formulation‖ to the threat experienced by an individual.379 The court stated 
that the ―threat must have left the particular victim ‗no reasonable 
 
 
 372. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 14 (NJ) (citations omitted). 
 373. Id. at 15.  
 374. Pharm. Care Sys. Ltd. v Att‘y Gen. [2004] CA 198/03, para. 93 (N.Z.). This is largely 
referring to business compulsion, economic duress, threat of criminal prosecution, and threats of civil 
process which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 375. Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long [1980] A.C. 614 (P.C.) (Eng.).  
 376. Id. at 635. 
 377. ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 47. But Enonchong argues that adding the severity of the 
illegitimate pressure adds an objective element that is not needed, and which is reminiscent of the 
reasonable firmness test. A detailed analysis of this argument and a detailed discussion of the 
economic duress case of Pao On is beyond the scope of this paper. Id. at 47–48.  
 378. Pharm. Care Sys. Ltd. v Att‘y Gen. [2004] CA 198/03 para. 98 (N.Z.) (citing Pao On v. Lau 
Yiu Long [1980] A.C. 614 at 636 (P.C.) (Eng.)). 
 379. Id. para. 96. 
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alternative.‘‖380 Thus, the standard favors subjective factors in the civil 
law. This standard may again be a lesson to be learned from contract law 
which would provide a workable criminal standard. 
2. Canada‘s ―Objective-Subjective‖ Standard in Criminal Duress 
One of the most important philosophical debates in criminal duress has 
centered on the ―objective-subjective‖ standard in duress.381 Hibbert was 
one of the first cases to thoroughly address this issue because of its focus 
on a ―safe avenue of escape.‖382 In Hibbert, the court analyzed this issue,383 
and Chief Justice Lamer noted that this element of duress was ―analogous 
to that in the defence of necessity identified by Justice Dickson—the 
requirement that compliance with the law be ‗demonstrably 
impossible.‘‖384 The court identified that, if an accused does not escape 
without ―undue danger,‖ the action would become ―a voluntary one, 
impelled by some consideration beyond the dictates of ‗necessity‘ and 
human instincts.‖385 Chief Justice Lamer drew the same conclusion with 
respect to the defense of duress. The court discussed the objective-
subjective standard and said that one who acts may be aware of the 
consequences of their actions even though they may not desire the 
outcome. The court used the example of a person with a gun to their head 
forced to drive an armed group to a bank. That person  
will usually know that the likely result of his or her actions will be 
that an attempt will be made to rob the bank, but he or she may not 
desire this result—indeed, he or she may strongly wish that the 
robbers‘ plans are ultimately foiled, if this could occur without risk 
to his or her own safety. In contrast, a person who is told that his or 
her child is being held hostage at another location and will be killed 
unless the robbery is successful will almost certainly have an active 
subjective desire that the robbery succeed. While the existence of 
threats clearly has a bearing on the motive underlying each actor's 
respective decision to assist in the robbery, only the first actor can 
be said not to desire that the robbery take place, and neither actor 
 
 
 380. Id. 
 381. See STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note 103, at 103. 
 382. R. v. Hibbert [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, para. 17 (Can.). 
 383. Id. para. 46. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge had erred in his 
instructions to the jury and ordered a new trial. 
 384. Id. para. 55. 
 385. Id. 
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can be said not to have knowledge of the consequences of their 
actions.386 
Chief Justice Lamer went on to say that ―excuse-based defences, such as 
duress, are predicated precisely on the view that the conduct of the 
accused is involuntary . . . he or she had no realistic alternative course of 
action available.‖387 Again, the voluntariness element is a factor in the 
court‘s consideration of the appropriate standard. 
Chief Justice Lamer concluded that the accused‘s ―perceptions of the 
surrounding facts can be highly relevant to the determination of whether 
his or her conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, and thus 
whether his or her conduct is properly excusable.‖388 Chief Justice Lamer 
stated that the Supreme Court had previously stated that when examining 
the 
[R]easonableness of an accused‘s conduct for the purposes of 
determining whether he or she should be excused from criminal 
responsibility, it is appropriate to employ an objective standard that 
takes into account the particular circumstances of the accused, 
including his or her ability to perceive the existence of alternative 
courses of action.389  
Thus, when it comes to assessing the situation, the court should assess the 
matter on an objective basis, but the standard should include subjective 
elements of the particular human frailty of the accused which amounts to 
an ―objective-subjective‖ standard.390  
This exact objective-subjective standard was adopted from the 1990 
case of R. v. Lavallee.391 In this self-defense and Battered Woman 
Syndrome case, the court specifically stated that the question for the fact-
finder is ―whether, given the history, circumstances and perceptions of the 
appellant, her belief that she could not preserve herself from being killed 
by [the deceased] that night except by killing him first was reasonable.‖392 
The subjective elements of the case now carried weight.  
Similarly, the Supreme Court grappled with this issue in the 2001 
necessity case of R. v. Latimer where Robert Latimer was convicted of 
 
 
 386. Id. para. 24. 
 387. Id. para. 61. 
 388. R. v. Hibbert [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, para. 61 (Can.). 
 389. Id. para. 59. 
 390. Id. para. 60. 
 391. R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.).  
 392. Id. at 889. 
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second degree murder for the asphyxiation of his severely disabled child, 
Tracey.393 In Latimer, the Court cited the case of Perka where Justice 
Dickson stated that necessity:  
rests on a realistic assessment of human weakness, recognizing that 
a liberal and humane criminal law cannot hold people to the strict 
obedience of laws in emergency situations where normal human 
instincts, whether of self-preservation or of altruism, 
overwhelmingly impel disobedience. The objectivity of the criminal 
law is preserved; such acts are still wrongful, but in the 
circumstances they are excusable. Praise is indeed not bestowed, but 
pardon is.394 
The Court added subjectivity to the standard but is careful to avoid the 
situation where a defense like necessity would ―very easily become simply 
a mask for anarchy.‖395 The Court realized, as Chief Justice Dickson said 
in Perka, this type of defense needs to be ―strictly controlled and 
scrupulously limited.‖396 Following this rationale, the Court in Latimer 
found that a ―modified objective test‖ would apply to two of the three 
requirements for necessity, situating the appropriate standard somewhere 
between an objective and subjective standard.397  
All of these developments in an objective-subjective test culminated in 
the Supreme Court decision in Ruzic.398 The Court in Ruzic adopted the 
argument relative to ―safe avenue of escape‖ from Hibbert and 
acknowledged that an objective-subjective standard should be used as the 
situation should be examined ―from the point of view of a reasonable 
person, but similarly situated.‖399 The Court said that the offender‘s 
―particular circumstances,‖ the availability of a ―reasonable alternative,‖ 
as well as his ―background and essential characteristics,‖ should be taken 
into account to provide a ―pragmatic assessment of the position of the 
accused, tempered by the need to avoid negating criminal liability on the 
 
 
 393. R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.R. 3 (Can.).  
 394. R. v. Hibbert [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 para. 52 (Can.) (quoting R. v. Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, 
248–49 (Can.)).  
 395. Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams, [1971] Eng. Rep. 175, 181 (cited in R. v. 
Latimer, [2001] S.C.R. 3, para. 27 (Can.)).  
 396. R. v. Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, para. 38 (Can.). 
 397. R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.R. 3, para. 32 (Can.). The court found that the element of 
proportionality must still be measured on an objective basis. This modified objective test has arisen in 
various other contexts. See Eric Colvin, Ordinary and Reasonable People: The Design of Objective 
Tests of Criminal Responsibility, 27 MONASH U. L. REV. 197, 222 (2001).  
 398. R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (Can.). 
 399. Id. para. 61. 
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basis of a purely subjective and unverifiable excuse.‖400 Thus, the 
defendant‘s subjective mental state again becomes a crucial consideration. 
Fletcher commends the German system and its use of the term 
―zumutbarkeit‖ which is ―roughly translated as attributability or 
imputability‖401 and what can be ―fairly expected‖ of an accused in certain 
circumstances.402 This term ―captures the question whether an individual 
can be justly held accountable for violating a rule.‖403 This type of inquiry 
seeks to avoid the constructs courts have used to analyze the defense. 
By adopting an objective-subjective standard, Canadian courts 
recognize the individual; perhaps this needs to be even further explored. In 
other words, ―individualizing excuses complements rather than detracts 
from the rule of law‖404 by ―relating to the character of the doer rather than 
to the quality of the deed.‖405 Fletcher admonishes those who think that a 
more individualized and subjective model cannot be adopted and he 
concludes that an individualized standard is essential in a situation where 
courts try to excuse, and have compassion for, an individual caught in a 
terrible situation with no easy escape.406 Commentators have concluded 
that the ―modified objective test does not just put the ordinary or 
reasonable person in the context of the accused. The objective test is 
personalized: the cognitive and volitional powers of the accused are 
incorporated in the standard against which the accused is measured.‖407 
Again, placing the actor in the act is the best way to understand this 
complex defense. When this standard is applied, the criminal defense 
coheres with the contractual standard. 
E. Burden of Proof 
1. Contractual Duress 
In contrast to the very detailed debates which have surrounded the onus 
and burden in the criminal law of duress as discussed below, contract law 
has been almost diametrically different. In Huyton S.A. v. Peter Cremer 
 
 
 400. Id. 
 401. George Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 
1300 (1974). 
 402. N.J. Reville, Duress: Sharp Shooting at Criminal Organisations, 131 SOLICITORS J. 1302, 
1304 (1987). 
 403. Fletcher, supra note 401, at 1300.  
 404. Id. at 1309.  
 405. Id. at 1272. 
 406. Id. at 1309. 
 407. Colvin, supra note 397, at 223. 
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GmbH & Co., Justice Mance noted that the onus as it relates to the civil 
law of duress is a ―relatively unexplored area.‖408 However, in Barton, 
Lord Scarman dictated the contractual onus in no uncertain terms. He 
noted that the plaintiff did not have to prove that but for the threats, he 
entered into the contract. Instead, in cases when the defendant was the 
person pressuring the plaintiff, the defendant had to establish that the 
―threats which he was making and the unlawful pressure which he was 
exerting for the purpose of inducing [the plaintiff] to sign the agreement 
and which [the plaintiff] knew were being made and exerted for this 
purpose in fact contributed nothing to [the plaintiff‘s] decision to sign.‖409 
In Barton, the Privy Council found that the plaintiff was in ―very real 
mental torment‖ and that if ―one man threatens another with unpleasant 
consequences if he does not act in a particular way, he must take the risk 
that the impact of his threats may be accentuated by extraneous 
circumstances for which he is not in fact responsible.‖410 The court found 
that this pressure was at least a factor in the signing of the documents and 
that the plaintiff was under duress, and thus the contracts are voidable by 
the plaintiff.
411
 Lord Scarman concluded that duress ―can, of course, exist 
even if the threat is one of lawful action: whether it does so depends upon 
the nature of the demand.‖412 Thus, as found in Barton, when the plaintiff 
proves that there was illegitimate pressure meant to induce the contract, 
then the ―onus shifts onto the party denying duress to establish that the 
illegitimate pressure which he exerted for the purpose of inducing the 
victim to enter into the transaction in fact contributed nothing to the 
decision of the victim to enter into the transaction.‖413 Because of the 
shifted burden, the defendant in Barton could not prove that his 
illegitimate pressure did not make the plaintiff enter into the contract, and 
the Privy Council agreed that the defendant was a reason for entering into 
this contract.
414
 While this makes for a very interesting burden shift, it is 
rarely discussed in the literature.
415
  
 
 
 408. Huyton S.A. v. Peter Cremer GmbH & Co, [1999] 1 Lloyd‘s Rep. 620 (K.B.) (Eng.); see also 
ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 42. 
 409. Barton v Armstrong (1975) 2 W.L.R. 1050, 1062 (P.C.) (Austl.). 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id.  
 412. Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. International Transport Workers‘ Federation, [1983] 1 
A.C. 366, 400 (H.L.) (Eng.). 
 413. ENONCHONG, supra note 20, at 42. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Theorist Nelson Enonchong has said that there may or may not be a different test for 
economic duress, but that analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.  
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2. Criminal Duress 
The burden of proof in the criminal law of duress has been relatively 
uncontroversial in the Commonwealth countries. Burden was discussed in 
the English case of R. v. Gill
416
 where the court cited Glanville Williams 
who claimed that  
[A]lthough it is convenient to call duress a ‗defense,‘ this does not 
mean that the ultimate (persuasive) burden of proving it is on the 
accused . . . But the accused must raise the defense by sufficient 
evidence to go to the jury; in other words, the evidential burden is 
on him.
417
  
The court also noted that it is incumbent on the defense to make duress 
a ―live issue‖ that is fit to be decided by the jury. Once this has been done 
―it is then for the Crown to destroy that defence in such a manner as to 
leave in the jury's minds no reasonable doubt that the accused cannot be 
absolved on the grounds of the alleged compulsion.‖418 
Similarly, it was noted in the 1968 case of R. v. Bone that ―[d]uress, like 
self-defence and like drunkenness, is something which must, in the first 
instance be raised by the defence; but at the end of the day it is always for 
the prosecution to prove their case, which involves negativing the defence 
which has been set up.‖419 Hasan is the most recent decision of the House 
of Lords to address the burden of proof.
420
 In that case, Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill cited Lynch
421
 and found that ―[w]here the evidence in the 
proceedings is sufficient to raise an issue of duress, the burden is on the 
prosecution to establish to the criminal standard that the defendant did not 
commit the crime with which he is charged under duress.‖422 Lord 
Bingham also cited the Law Commission No. 218
423
 from 1993 and their 
recommendation that a burden, on the balance of probabilities, be placed 
on the defendant to establish a defense of duress.
424
 He noted that ―the 
 
 
 416. R. v. Gill, [1963] 2 All E.R. 688, 691 (appeal taken from Bedford County Sessions). 
 417. WILLIAMS, supra note 68, at 762. 
 418. R. v. Gill, [1963] 2 All E.R. 688, 691. 
 419. R. v. Bone, (1968), 52 Crim. App. 546 (C.A.) 548. 
 420. R. v. Hasan, [2005] UKHL 22 (U.K.). 
 421. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653 (H.L.).  
 422. R. v. Hasan, [2005] UKHL 22, para. 20 (U.K.). 
 423. U.K. LAW COMMISSION NO. 218, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: OFFENCES AGAINST 
THE PERSON AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES (1993).  
 424. Id. at 59–60. 
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defence of duress is peculiarly difficult for the prosecution to investigate 
and disprove beyond reasonable doubt.‖425  
Just as in England, the question of the burden of proof has also been an 
ongoing question in Canadian law. There is no onus on the accused to 
prove the defense of duress on the balance of probabilities or any other 
standard in Canada, however, the accused must show that the elements of 
the defense have an ―air of reality,‖ or a standard of believability, in their 
particular situation.
426
 The air of reality test was adopted by the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal in R. v. Bergstrom.
427
 It was recognized in Bergstrom that 
the trial judge must place before the jury ―any defence available on the 
evidence irrespective of whether defence counsel has advanced it‖428 but 
there must be an air of reality. As stated by Justice Cory in R. v. Osolin, 
there must be ―some evidence capable of supporting the particular defence 
alleged by the accused . . . a juror should not be required to listen to 
instructions on defences which simply cannot be applicable to the case that 
they have heard.‖429 Some commentators predict that there may be a shift 
in this position following the reverse onus cases
430
 of R. v. Daviault
431
 and 
R. v. Stone;
432
 however, there was no mention of this reversal in Ruzic. 
Coughlan notes that: 
 within the past few years [the Court has] placed the onus on the 
accused to prove, on balance of probabilities, that he or she was 
drunk to a state akin to automatism, or that he or she was an 
automaton for any other reason. This creates the anomaly that the 
onus is now on the accused to prove physical involuntariness, but 
still on the Crown to disprove moral involuntariness.
433
  
Surprisingly, in Ruzic there was also no mention of the ―presumption of 
voluntariness‖434 that Justice Bastarache invoked for a 5–4 majority in 
 
 
 425. R. v. Hasan, [2005] UKHL 22 [20] (U.K.). 
 426. See R. v. Cinous, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); R. v. T.L.C., (2004) A.J. No. 800, para. 73 (Can. 
Alta.). There has been little suggestion in other countries that there should be a shift in the burden of 
proof. 
 427. R. v. Bergstrom (1980), 13 Crim. Rep. 3d 342, para. 41 (Man. C.A.), aff‘d in (1981), 20 
Crim. Rep. 3d 347 (Can.). 
 428. STUART, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 460 (citing R. v. Squire (1976), 2 S.C.R. 13 
(Can.); R. v. Martin (1980), 53 C.C.C. 2d 425, 443–44 (Can. Ont. C.A.)). 
 429. R. v. Osolin (1994), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, paras. 189, 194 (Can.). 
 430. A concept in Canadian law where the onus is shifted to the defendant rather than the 
prosecution. 
 431. R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (Can.). 
 432. R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (Can.). 
 433. Coughlan, supra note 222, at 185. 
 434. R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 para. 3 (Can.). 
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Stone. It seems as if Stone will not affect duress, at least at this particular 
time, but there is a possibility that the automatism cases will be reconciled 
with duress in the future.  
Justice Bastarache clearly noted that ―since a defence of automatism 
amounts to a claim that one's actions were not voluntary, the accused must 
rebut the presumption of voluntariness. An evidentiary burden is thereby 
imposed on the accused.‖435 It has been noted by Stuart that ―the majority 
in Stone expressly said that they were dealing with all claims of 
involuntariness.‖436 Yet, this presumption was not discussed in the case of 
duress.
437
 Instead, Justice LeBel stated that: 
[t]here was no misdirection either on the burden of proof. The 
accused must certainly raise the defence and introduce some 
evidence about it. Once this is done, the burden of proof shifts to the 
Crown under the general rule of criminal evidence. It must be 
shown, beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not act 
under duress.
438
 
As noted, Ruzic adopted the air of reality test as ―the accused bears an 
evidential burden of laying a factual foundation for the defense of duress 
(if no such foundation may be inferred from the Crown's case). Once the 
factual foundation is established, the Crown has the onus of disproving 
duress.‖439 Thus, although the defense must raise an air of reality, the 
Crown has the onus to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Ruzic accords with the discussion of burden that comes from the 2002 
Supreme Court case R. v. Cinous, where it was found that the court must 
ask whether there is  
 
 
 435. R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 para. 171 (Can.). 
 436. Stuart, Moral, supra note 229, at 38. 
 437. The Supreme Court in Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 43, did note that  
[t]he principle of voluntariness was given constitutional status in R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 
S.C.R. 63, 102–03 (Can.) where Justice Cory held for the majority that it would infringe s. 7 
of the Charter to convict an accused who was not acting voluntarily, as a fundamental aspect 
of the actus reus would be absent. More recently, in Stone, the crucial role of voluntariness as 
a condition of the attribution of criminal liability was again confirmed ( para. 1, per Justice 
Binnie, and paras. 155–58, per Justice Bastarache) in an appeal concerning the defence of 
automatism. 
The court did not comment further on these cases that suggested a different burden. 
 438. R. v. Ruzic [1998], 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 100 (Can.). 
 439. Id. para. 71. For a recent discussion of the air of reality test in Canada, see R. v. McRae, 
(2005) 77 O.R. 3d 1. See also R. v. Laughy, (2006) 394 A.R. 265 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Osemele (2004), 
65 W.C.B. 2d 530, [2004] O.J. No. 5842 (Ont. Ct. Just.); R. v. Ferguson (2004), 50 M.V.R. (4th) 267, 
[2004] Y.J. No. 7 (Yuk. T.C.). 
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(1) evidence (2) upon which a properly instructed jury acting 
reasonably could acquit if it believed the evidence to be true. The 
second part of this question can be rendered by asking whether the 
evidence put forth is reasonably capable of supporting the 
inferences required to acquit the accused. This is the current state of 
the law, uniformly applicable to all defences.
440
  
In the United States, it seems resolved that the ―[d]efendant must come 
forward with some evidence of the defense, but the State bears the 
ultimate responsibility to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.‖441 In Washington v. Riker,442 the defendant argued that ―she had to 
prove the defense only to the extent that it created a reasonable doubt in 
the minds of the jurors as to her guilt . . . [which is] a lower standard than 
‗preponderance of the evidence.‘‖443 However, the court found that it was 
up to the defendant to prove duress by the higher standard of a 
preponderance of evidence because with duress defenses, there is no doubt 
that the accused committed the crime, rather the question is whether the 
accused‘s conduct should be excused.444  
There is another school of thought in the United States that believes the 
prosecution has the burden for justifications, but that the defendant has the 
burden with excuses.
445
 Another argument, most often heard in the context 
of Battered Woman Syndrome, is that ―fear of fostering the ‗abuse excuse‘ 
can perhaps be allayed by saddling the defendant with the ultimate burden 
of persuasion on her coercion defence.‖446 Although this matter seems 
relatively resolved, there is huge potential for change in the future, 
especially in the context of the battered offender because of the criticisms 
that Battered Woman Syndrome experiences today. Thus, this standard is 
being applied similarly in contractual and criminal duress. 
 
 
 440. R. v. Cinous, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 82 (Can.). 
 441. New Jersey v. Romano, 809 A.2d 158, 167 (2002). 
 442. Washington v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1994).  
 443. Id. at 51; see also Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women 
Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN‘S L.J. 217, 314 (2003). 
 444. Washington v. Riker, 869 P.2d at 52. 
 445. Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the 
Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1172 n.66 (1987). Dressler clarifies that this is ―not a 
constitutionally based argument. As a matter of due process principles, a legislature may require the 
defendant to carry the burden of proof regarding any true. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237 (1987) 
(permitting legislature to place burden of proof on defendant to prove justification of self-defense). 
However, Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2005), clarified that this is for the defendant to prove 
on a preponderance of evidence, and the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 446. Laurie Kratky Doré, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in 
Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 762–63 (1995).  
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IV. COMPARISON OF CONTRACTUAL AND CRIMINAL DURESS 
Although there are many differences in the approach to criminal and 
contractual duress, there are a few points worth highlighting. Despite the 
similarities, there are some real problems comparing the contractual law of 
duress and the criminal defense given the lack of reported decisions, and 
many of the issues result from inherent problems with the criminal system. 
Wertheimer notes that  
We know more of cases in which it was alleged that the trial court 
improperly excluded a duress defense. When, for example, a 
defendant allegedly assisted in a robbery under a threat of death, the 
appellate court ruled that he was entitled to have the jury consider 
his claim of duress.
447
  
More often than not, cases of criminal duress are dismissed without a 
reported comment;
448
 which can lead to several conclusions about the state 
of criminal duress. First, criminal duress does seem less burdensome to 
establish than civil duress, as can be seen in the 1887 case from Georgia, 
McCoy v. State.
449
 This case was a rare opportunity for a state appellate 
court to comment on the difference between contractual and criminal 
duress. This was a murder case concerning the death of a revenue officer 
by the defendant McCoy.
450
 The jury was given the wrong standard of 
duress by the trial judge: in response to a situation where a witness was 
threatened with his life if he testified against McCoy, the judge 
erroneously gave the jury the civil contractual standard rather than the 
criminal defense.
451
 The state appellate court had an opportunity to 
respond to the comparison of the civil and criminal standard stating that  
It must be obvious to the deliberate judgment of every reflecting 
mind that much less freedom of will is requisite to render a person 
responsible for crime than to bind him by a sale or other contract. 
To overcome the will, so far as to render it incapable of contacting a 
civil obligation, is a mere trifle compared with reducing it to that 
degree of slavery and submission which will exempt from 
punishment.
452
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This seems to be a common undercurrent in cases; courts seem willing to 
believe one can be forced into a contract, but are less likely to recognize 
that one could be compelled to commit the most heinous of crimes. 
In order to fully analyze contract and criminal law, one must also 
examine the remedies that are available to discern the value of this 
defense. In contract law, once the contract has been disaffirmed the victim 
is ―entitled to restitution, either in kind, if it is possible to restore what the 
victim has given to the other party, or in the form of a money judgment 
based on the benefit that the victim has conferred. In return, the victim 
must make restitution.‖453 Similar relief is available under the system of 
equity through a ―constructive trust on or to cancel a conveyance of 
property . . . benefited by services furnished to an equitable lien.‖454 The 
other options available to one who has entered into a contract under duress 
are  
If the benefit is money, it is recoverable in restitution in an action 
for money had and received . . . if it is services, a claim for services 
rendered (quantum meruit) will lie; if it is a chattel, the property 
will normally remain in the transferor who will have his remedies in 
tort, otherwise there will be a claim for goods delivered (quantum 
valebat).
455
  
Additionally, as seen in many of the above examples, deeds or contracts 
can be avoided if duress makes the document void.
456
 Third parties may 
have to make restitution depending on the type of benefit given.
457
 
Conversely, even though Ruzic has made the criminal defense 
somewhat more accessible by striking down the immediacy and presence 
requirements, criminal duress is still a gamble. There are not multiple 
remedies available in criminal law as in civil law. In Canada, the way that 
the defense has been recognized, many times, results in an all or nothing 
situation of a full acquittal or finding of guilt.
 
Some have suggested that 
the defense be abolished, and all evidence be submitted purely as an 
element in the mitigation of sentence. Critics warn that individuals will be 
saddled with the burden of the stigma of conviction; however, from the 
brief examination of some of the recent cases which use duress in 
mitigation, the stigma is much worse with a penitentiary sentence after a 
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full exculpatory defense of duress fails, and the sentencer is unsympathetic 
to the evidence of duress.
458
 In cases where the defense has been used and 
rejected, the weight of duress on sentencing is relatively little.
459
 Even 
though they would not have met the test for duress, where the accused has 
immediately entered a guilty plea (especially in some narcotic importation 
cases) the factors for duress were taken more seriously in mitigation.
460
 
Despite this, other cases have found overwhelming evidence of duress 
unconvincing. What is clear is that there must be consistent use of duress 
both as a defense and in mitigation. 
If the defense of duress were factored into the sentencing phase of 
trial—with a clearly articulated sentencing principle of a mitigating 
excuse—the difficulties of applying duress in mitigation would be limited. 
Instead, courts would find an appropriate sentence for the offender acting 
under duress. Advocating a new system that makes duress an important 
factor can only improve the present sentencing system. However, it is 
unlikely that this principled approach will be a reality in the near future 
since this would involve a total rehashing of the historical and 
philosophical underpinnings which are unlikely to change. 
The legitimate-illegitimate pressure debate that surrounds the 
contractual duress cases is not relevant to the criminal defense. As 
Wertheimer noted, it is ―unlawful to coerce (or induce) someone to do 
something unlawful, there is no potential ‗lawfulness‘ of the coercion to 
distinguish cases of duress from cases where there is no duress.‖461 There 
seems to be no level of criminal duress that is ―okay‖; the court views this 
type of pressure as the most serious of acts, but many have wondered why 
less pressure is needed to vitiate consent in contracts than is needed in the 
criminal law.
462
 One obvious explanation is that one‘s liberty is at stake in 
 
 
 458. See P.R. Glazebrook, Committing Murder Under Duress—Again, [1976] CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
206; B. Sneiderman, Perspectives on the Latimer Trial: Latimer in the Supreme Court: Necessity, 
Compassionate Homicide and Mandatory Sentencing, 64 SASK. L. REV. 511 (2001). 
 459. See Lynch, supra note 166, at 696. Lord Simon also recognized these limitations and said: 
―it is true that the Home Secretary can advise exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy, and 
that the Parole Board can mitigate the rigour of the penal code; but these are executive not 
forensic processes, and can only operate after the awful verdict with its dire sentence has been 
pronounced. Is a sane and humane law incapable of encompassing this situation? I do not 
believe so.‖  
See also R. v. Hasan, [2005] UKHL 22, paras. 69–70 (U.K.); André Gombay, Duress and Free 
Will Symposium: Necessitating without Inclining, 24 CAMBRIDGE J. DIALOGUE 579, 579 (1985). 
 460. R. v. John Doe, [2005] O.T.C. 719, 67 W.C.B. (2d) 256 (Ont. S.C.J.).  
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the criminal system, and it is not in the contractual context. Wertheimer 
goes one step further and says that, if  
A gets B to agree to do X by wrongly applying pressure to B, a rule 
that excuses B from the agreement shifts the burden back to the 
wrongdoer (A) himself. If, as in the typical three-party case of 
criminal duress, A wrongly exerts pressure on B to commit a crime 
against C, a rule that excuses B shifts the harm to an innocent third 
party (C.)
463
  
Thus, it may be the view of our society that it is worse for B to harm C 
(who is an ―innocent‖ party) than to harm A, who is considered guilty. In 
fact, most of the contractual cases that have been examined have found the 
court rather unwilling to invalidate a contract when there is an innocent 
third party involved, as opposed to when A coerces B to contract with A 
himself. With an innocent third party involved, the case is much more like 
a typical criminal matter, and the court seems to find much more blame for 
A and B for involving C.
464
 It may also be, as suggested by Wertheimer, 
that in criminal law society is concerned with blaming all parties 
responsible for certain actions. In contrast, in contract law society seems 
much more willing to accept that there may be only one party that 
deserves to be punished by revoking the contract, thus requiring a lesser 
burden.
465
 Sadly, given the historic development of duress, it is still true 
that ―courts state illogical or nonsensical tests for application of the 
doctrine and then apply the tests conclusorily or with implausible or 
impossible explanation of rationale.‖466 Unfortunately for the study of the 
doctrine, many appeals cases are simply a review of summary judgment 
motions and nothing much more is learned about the application of duress 
to contract law.
467
 Furthermore, most appeals cases involve very 
sympathetic victims like Ms. Ruzic and are not the typical cases. Although 
the court has traditionally espoused the view that individuals should be 
free to contract, a review of the case law discussed throughout this Article 
shows that courts are willing to intervene in difficult circumstances 
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 464. Id. 
 465. Id. at 163. 
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pushing the boundaries of contractual duress, but some courts have clearly 
misapplied doctrine. As some commentators have noted,  
[a] review of recent cases reveals that a shocking amount of repair 
is necessary to salvage the doctrine. The doctrine originally existed 
as a tool to police bargains that were the product of significantly 
constrained choice when that constraint resulted from blameworthy 
conduct of the other party to the bargain. It should continue to do so 
as a way of maximizing justice. Courts of today have become mired 
in confusing precedent and related doctrines and have, thus, lost 
their way.
468
  
It is possible to repair this doctrine by making sense of the definition of 
contractual and criminal duress and making the application of other 
vitiating factors more clear.  
CONCLUSION 
As John Dawson noted in 1947, the law of contractual duress ―reflects 
the convergence of several lines of growth . . . . Its result has certainly not 
been a coherent body of doctrine, unified around some central proposition 
. . . .‖469 The sad truth is that ―this field offers no great encouragement for 
those who seek to summarize results in any single formula.‖470 However, 
the lack of a single formula necessitates that each case be examined for the 
type of duress threatened, its impact on the victim, and the result for the 
parties involved.  
The best summation of the law of contractual duress is that offered by 
Bigwood who noted that it is comprised of ―illegitimate pressure‖ applied 
by a threat of improper conduct which ―compels the will‖ of the victim.471 
What Bigwood means by compulsion of the will is to leave the victim with 
no reasonable alternative but to capitulate.
472
 This effect of contractual 
duress is to make the contract voidable by the person under duress. 
What one needs to keep in mind is a set of rules which ―commands 
rational assent.‖473 The rules that dictate that a tortured individual had no 
contractual choice is negated by the court spending copious time analyzing 
what choices were available and ―does not inspire confidence among 
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rational beings.‖474 This topic is so complex because it does question when 
it is permissible for a ―victim of duress to reopen a question which has 
apparently been closed by his submission to the coercion.‖475 Again, this 
leads to a situation where one has to risk everything to admit to the court 
that the contract was signed with some level of consent, but the court 
should look beyond the obvious evidence. It is often difficult for many 
courts to look behind the contract to the imperfect actors, but overall the 
civil law system is doing a good job with the broad interpretation and 
application of duress. 
Clearly, the criminal defense of duress has a troubled history. As 
Shaffer argues, ―[t]he story of duress in Canada is the story of the law 
striving, rather unsuccessfully, to grapple with . . . policy questions.‖476 
Little thought was given to the defense at the time of the inception of the 
Criminal Code because there were very few cases utilizing the defense. 
The original statutory conception of the defense was very restrictive, but 
only less restrictive because the codifiers did not wholly accept the views 
of Stephen. Stephen‘s formulation was simply a compromise between 
disallowing a controversial defense completely and fear that it would 
become a free pass for criminals. Section 17, thus, reflects the 
ambivalence that has always characterized the duress defense, namely 
whether coercion should ever excuse the commission of a criminal 
offense.
477
 Stephen‘s personal focus on duress created an artificial and 
disproportionate suppression of the defense, despite the possible goals of 
its earliest framers.  
Ultimately, despite the ambiguities in Ruzic, the message that has 
emerged is that punishing those under duress is ―an agonizing choice. 
When the criminal law absolves an accused in such a case it is being 
compassionate, temperate and realistic rather than making moral 
judgments.‖478 Some of the cases show people making impossible choices 
in horrendous situations. The result is that hard cases make bad law 
because in much of the Commonwealth the development of the defense 
has been ―anachronistic and independent of any proper theoretical or 
jurisprudential analysis. This situation . . . has led directly to the anomalies 
which at present surround the defence in most common law 
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jurisdictions.‖479 Perhaps a future case will have the facts necessary to set 
a firm basis for the defense in Canada, the United States and beyond that 
fits the uniqueness of these offenders while taking into account that ―a 
sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offense and the degree 
of responsibility of the offender.‖480 From a historical, philosophical, and 
pragmatic perspective, society should not leave such an important part of 
the criminal system to function without clear, and specific, guidelines. 
Duress should be completely exculpatory at one end of the continuum and 
continue to develop as a defense. On the other end of the spectrum, there 
should be mitigation, which could drastically affect the length of sentence. 
Presently, it seems likely that the excluded offenses portion remains of 
Section 17 of the Criminal Code. Since it is more likely that these 
defenses will continue to be shaped by the common law rather than 
through wide legislative reform, it is important to determine what will 
inform the common law. It is arguable what, if any, of the excluded 
offenses will remain even though the retention of any excluded offenses is 
irrational judged by the historic and philosophical basis of the defense. 
The future of the defense will mean that a more strict interpretation will be 
employed; however, if the defense is strictly applied, it should also be 
logically employed. Duress is certainly not perfect, but it should determine 
how society makes concessions to human frailties for those caught in 
impossible situations. Theorists have noted that the reasoning in Ruzic, 
which is—mostly a policy decision recognizing human frailty, may be 
very difficult to apply by Canada‘s Supreme Court in the future. However, 
change to the code needs to occur because choosing to continue to apply 
an unworkable section is no longer feasible; the codified version of the 
defense has remained unworkable for centuries, even after Ruzic. The code 
needs updating. 
With change, the defense of duress may achieve a level of coherence 
for the first time in its long history. There is obvious frustration by 
theorists who are unable to distill a common ground for the defense. As 
recently as 2005, Gale notes that, in a British context, it is imperative for 
the legislature to consider options and decide on a ―definition with which 
the judiciary can work, rather than leaving the judges in a position where it 
is clear they do not really like what has been created by their predecessors, 
but feel unable to change it for fear of accusations of usurping the role of 
Parliament.‖481 Trying to compartmentalize the defense has only led to 
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confusion, conviction and persecution of those who might not have 
deserved the punishment received.  
This Article concludes with suggestions that any reformulation of the 
Criminal Code defense should take into account the following elements:  
a. The threat should be of serious harm or bodily injury, either 
mentally or physically, and can be to any third party or oneself; 
b. Duress should be a defense to all offenses, including all cases of 
murder and treason;
482
 
c. The offenders should have to demonstrate that they did not have 
a safe avenue of escape or, if they did, a reasonable excuse why 
they did not take that escape. Similarly, offenders should have to 
demonstrate that they desisted from the crime and contacted the 
police as soon as reasonably possible. Special consideration should 
go to those offenders who are in an abusive relationship in order to 
understand that police protection or escape may not have been a 
reasonable option; 
d. Those offenders who are acting under prior fault will be 
precluded from using the defense if they exposed themselves to the 
harm without reasonable excuse. This is the case if the accused had 
actual knowledge of the workings of a criminal organization, not 
negligence or presumed knowledge. This does not include the 
battered offender. The test would be a reasonable person similarly 
situated; 
e. Proportionality is already a factor of duress, and it should no 
longer be an additional factor to consider; 
 
 
 482. As noted by the U.K. Law Commission in A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? A 
Consultation Paper, in the U.K. there are several arguments to extended the duress to all offenders as 
(1) With the enactment of a tightly defined defence the question of its application to murder 
can be considered on its merits, untrammeled by authority. 
(2) Innocent life is not effectively protected by a rule of which the actor is unlikely to be 
aware. 
(3) It is for the jury to say whether the threat was one ―which [D could not] reasonably be 
expected to resist‖. ―The law should not demand more than human frailty can sustain. 
(4) The defence is not available to a member of a criminal or a terrorist group. Innocent tools 
of terrorists should be excused if they could not have been expected to act otherwise. They 
should not be denied the right to raise a true defence because others may claim it falsely. 
U.K. LAW COMMISSION NO. 177, A NEW HOMICIDE ACT FOR ENGLAND AND WALES? A 
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f. An individual assessment of the individual offender has to occur 
in a reasoned, but limited way, to take the subjective elements of the 
accused into account; 
g. If the full defence fails for an offender, they should have the 
opportunity to fully present their case regarding the duress suffered 
and how this should amount to a mitigating factor; 
h. Finally, the accused should simply have to pass the ―air of 
reality‖ test.483 
The alternative argument of sentencing also could serve as a way of 
indirectly addressing the inconsistencies and difficulties in duress. 
There is no denying that there has been an ―extraordinary expansion of 
the scope of duress‖ in the contractual realm, while there has been an 
absolute narrowing of the criminal defense so that it is hardly used 
successfully in any modern case.
484
 The courts in Canada, the United 
States, and the Commonwealth seem ready and able to expand these 
contractual principles to property law, family law, business law, maritime 
law, estate and trust law applying the factors in very disparate cases. At 
the same time, the criminal defense of duress is narrowing to the point that 
horribly abused individuals are unable to use the defense against their 
tormenters.
485
 Perhaps both statements are correct. The law of duress is 
―irrational, anomalous, perverse, illogical and fundamentally wrong‖486 
and it is misunderstood. The coming cases will decide which statement 
will prevail.  
 
 
 483. The ―air of reality‖ test is discussed in several cases. See, e.g., R. v. Laughy, (2006) 394 A.R. 
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Ferguson (2004), 50 M.V.R. (4th) 267, [2004] Y.J. No. 7 (Yuk. T.C.). 
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